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GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF URBAN LAND USE:
A COMPARATIVE MAJOR PROGRAM ANALYSIS
QUINTIN JOHNSTONE·
Among the most troublesome urban problems facing American society
are those that are closely tied to how land is used, including how land
should be developed and how land use resources should be allocated.
Most of our population lives and works in metropolitan areas and is
intimately affected by how these urban land use related problems are dealt
with. Satisfactory progress in solving or at least substantially alleviating
these problems may be necessary if this country is to avoid increasing the
polarity between rich and poor and between privileged and disadvantaged
that can have such long-term adverse national consequences. Among the
many current land use related urban problems are housing quality and
affordability, especially for the poor; neighborhood security from crime
and violence; the extent and impact of racial, ethnic and class segregation
in urban communities; pollution and other threats to the natural
environment; the amount and burden of taxes and other charges on real
estate, including property taxes and utility costs; and channeling urban
growth and revitalization efforts. Concerns over these and other land use
related problems are accentuated by uncertainties as to the future. That
American urban areas will change over time is assured. Whether that
change will be for better or worse is difficult to predict, but current trends
justify pessimism about many areas.
Given the seriousness of urban land use related problems and the
widespread concerns they have created, government frequently has
responded with legal controls. Major government efforts usually consist
of programs of action, with legal controls as essential components. This
article focuses on four such programs, each different and each highly
important. The commonly used term "government program" as used here
means government efforts to help resolve some aspects of an urban land
use-related problem through imposition of legal controls, with the
government efforts focused on achieving at least some clearly declared
objectives, and with a government administrative staff having been
assigned responsibility for administering the controls and achieving the
declared objectives. The four programs that this article reviews are public
housing, federally aided urban renewal, zoning, and managed growth.
The principal purpose of this article in exploring this sampling of
programs is to come to some at least tentative generalizations as to how
government deals with urban land use related problems, its effectiveness
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and limitations in doing so, and how its efforts might be improved. The
programs considered are sufficiently diverse in the problems they are
grappling with and the range of controls they impose to give the basis for
cautious generalizing. Each of the programs considered also is of such
importance as to merit current review and evaluation of its performance
quite apart from its relevance to broader generalizations. Each has been
in effect in many communities and has made a major impact on urban land
use. Each has also drawn heavy criticism and has generated extensive
controversy. This article gives special attention to program criticisms and
controversies, as these factors are so important in how programs are
shaped, how they evolve, and in what they are able to achieve. Despite
being controversial in many communities, the programs remain as major
means of control in much of the United States. The one exception is
federal urban renewal which has been terminated, although succeeded by
other less ambitious government programs seeking similar renewal
objectives. Urban renewal is included not only because of its aggressive
approach to crucial urban problems but because of what it indicates as to
why major land use related programs may ultimately be closed down after
many years of significant impact.
1. PUBLIC HOUSING
Public housing-government owned and operated rental housing for
the poor-emerged out of the Depression of the 1930s as a major housing
program involving joint participation by federal and local government.1
1. Thereis extensive literature on public housing going back to the 1930s, although
scholarly interest has declined in recent years. Some of the more helpful public housing
publications are these: NAT. Ass'N OF HOUSING AND REDEV. OFFICIALS, THE MANY
FACES OF PUBuc HOUSING (1990) [hereinafter NAHRO REPORT]; RACHEL G. BRA'IT,
REBUILDING A Low- INCOME HOUSING POLICY (1989); ROBERT MOORE FIsHER, 20
YEARS OF PUBLIC HOUSING (1959); LAWRENCE M. FRmoMAN, GOVERNMENT AND
SLUM HOUSING, A CENTURY OF FRUSTRATION (1968); EUGENE J. MEEHAN, PuBLIC
HOUSING POLICY, CONYENTIONVERSUS REALTIY (1975); RA¥MOND J. STRUYK, A Nmv
SYSTEM FOR PuBLIC HOUSING, SAVING A NATIONAL REsOURCE (1980); IRVING
WELFELD, WHERE WE LIVE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN HOUSING (1988);
REPORT OF THE NAT. COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBS. (DOUGLAS COMMISSION),
BUILDINGTHEAMERIcANCTIY 108-33,188-190 (1968); REPORT OF THE NAT. HOUSING
TASK FORCE, A DECENT PLACE TO LIVE (1988), reprinted in Senate Hearings 689,
100th Congr., 2d. Sess. 133, 172-75 (1988); John Atlas & Peter Dreier, From "Projects"
to Communities: Redeeming Public Housing, 50 J. HOUSING 21 (1993); John F.
Bauman, Public Housing: The Dreadful Saga ofa Durable Policy, 8 J. PL. LIT. 347
(1994); Charles E. Connerly, lWlat Should Be Done With the Public Housing Program,
52 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 142 (1986); Fred Fuchs, Introduction to HUD Conventional
Public Housing, Section 8 Existing Housing, Voucher, andSubsidizedHousing Programs,
Part I, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 782 (1991); Michael H. Schill, Distressed Public
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The vast preponderance of public housing in the United States has been
and continues to be federally aided,2 but there are some local public
housing authorities that operate without federal assistance, receiving
government financial assistance only from state or local sources.3 Under
the federally aided program, the federal government provides much of the
funding; and local public housing authorities build, maintain, and operate
the housing, subject to some restrictions imposed by federal statutes and
regulations. State enabling acts provide for the creation of local public
housing authorities.4 A large number of units have been added to the
national stock of public housing since the late 1930s but with sharp
variations over time. A surge of additions occurred in the early 1950s and
again in the period 1968 to 1974, but relatively few units have been added
in recent years. Added units have been mostly of new structures built as
public housing, although some tax foreclosed properties, former military
facilities, and other used structures have been converted to public housing.
A small percentage of all units have been withdrawn from the public
housing stock, mostly by demolition or sale.
Currently, there are approximately 1.4 million public housing units in
the United States,s and a total of 3,200 local public housing authorities
Housing: \WJere Do We Go From Here?, 60 U. Cm. L. REv. 497 (1993) [hereinafter
Distressed Public Housing]; Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing
Assistance: The Case ofPublic Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 878 (1990) [hereinafter
Privitizing Federal Low Income Housing]; Special Project, Public Housing, 22 VAND.
L. REv. 875 (1968-1969).
Much of the data in the NAHRO Report is from a 1989 NAHRO survey of 202
public housing authorities across the country, authorities that manage 45 percent of all
public housing units. The general tone and approach of the NAHRO Report is pro-public
housing.
2. Federal participation in the public housing program started with the Housing Act
of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412,50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437
(1988 & Supp. 1992».
3. Five hundred local public housing authorities operate without federal funding
assistance, mostly in small cities, each authority responsible for a small number of units.
NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY INSTITUTE, THE SILENT SCANDAL 1 (1991).
4. E.g., the Public Housing Authority enabling legislation in the State ofNew York,
a very important public housing state, N.Y. Public Housing Law, §§ 400-566 (McKinney
1989 & Supp. 1994).
5. COUNCll. OF LAROE PuB. HOUSING AUTHS., BASIC FACTS ABOUT PuBLIC
HOUSING, 1 (Feb. 1993) [hereinafter BASIC FACTS]. Eight percent of the 1,400,000 units
were unoccupied as of 1991. Id.
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are active in administering the 13,200 public housing developments.6 Not
surprisingly, public housing is heavily concentrated in big cities and the
sixteen largest public housing authorities, excluding the one in New York
City, operate thirty percent of all public housing units, an average of
18,000 units per authority.7 Half the units operated by these sixteen
authorities are "high-rise" buildings-four stories or more.8 The New
York City Housing Authority operates by far the largest number of
housing units of any authority in the United States, a total of almost
180,000 units,9 and most of these units are in high-rise buildings. Since
1968, construction of new high-rise federally aided public housing
structures for families with children has generally been prohibited.10
Nationally, a total of about 3.4 million people are estimated to be
living in public housing. 11 Residents are poor, with household incomes
averaging less than one-fourth of the national average for household
income.12 A majority of public housing households have no wage
earner,13 and a majority of public housing tenants are on welfare or
social security.14 Also, over two-thirds of public housing residents are
nonwhite,lS and many projects are totally or extensively segregated by
6. BASIC FACTS, supra note 5, at 1. The number of public housing residents
(3,400,000) is probably substantially understated, as it does not include illegal residents.
ld. at 11 n.4. The New York Public Housing Authority estimates that there are 38,000
illegal families living in New York public housing, a total of 105,000 persons. ld.
7. NAHRO REPORT, supra note 1, at 28.
8. ld. at 19.
9. Stephan B. Kinnaird, Note, Public Housing: Abandon HOPE, But Not
Privatization, 103 YALE L.l. 961 (1994).
10. 42 U.S.C. §1437d(a) (Supp. 1992).
11. BASIC FACTS, supra note 5, at 1.
12. NAHRO REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
13. Only forty percent ofnonelderly public housing households have a wage earner.
Atlas & Dreier, supra note 1, at 26.
14. The NAHRO survey disclosed that as of 1988, public housing residents' income
sources were employment income, 24 percent; social security, 24 percent; welfare, 41
percent; and the remainder from miscellaneous sources. See NAHRO REPoRT, supra
note 1, at 2. A 1992 Council of Large Public Housing Authorities study showed that
only about 20% of households in public housing depend primarily on earned income.
BASIC FACTS, supra note 5, at 3.
15. A Council ofLarge Public Housing Authorities' study disclosed that in 1992 the
race-ethnic percentages of public housing residents to be white, 33%; black, 56%;
Hispanic, 7%; Asians, 2 %; Native Americans and others, 2%. BASIC FACTS, supra note
5, at 3. In family developments (nonelderly developments), the percentages were white,
20%; black, 70%; Hispanic, 7%; Asians, 2%; Native Americans and others, 2%. ld.
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race.16 A high percentage of public housing households with children are
headed by a single parent, usually the mother.17 Some projects are
restricted to the elderly, and in all projects about 600,000 occupants are
elderly.18
As knowledgeable observers in a recent article stated: "The first thing
to appreciate about public housing is that it has become the housing of last
resort for the very poor-often those without jobs, skills, or hopes. "19
Yet, there is insufficient public housing to fill the demand. Estimates are
that as many as one million households are on public housing waiting
lists.20 Waiting time before units become available varies considerably
among cities. In small cities it is often only a year, in some big cities it
is eight or more years.21 And obviously, far more households below the
poverty line that are not on public housing waiting lists need better or
cheaper housing that public housing might provide if available.22
16. On racial segregation in public housing, see BRAIT, supra note I, at 70-72;
HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY (John M. Goering ed., 1986);
LAWRENCE FRmDMAN, PuBLIC HOUSING: THE POLmCS OF POVERTY, ch. 4 (1969); and
Schill, Distressed Public Housing, supra note I, at 514-15,519-20.
17. The NAHRO survey found that 60 percent of public housing households
included children and over three-fourths of these households with children were headed
by single parents. NAHRO REPORT, supra note I, at 2.
18. [d. at 4.
19. Atlas & Dreier, supra note I, at 21. The NAHRO Report makes a similar
observation: "[M]ore and more, it [public housing] has become a permanent rather than
a temporary solution [for residents]. This has happened because the socioeconomic
characteristics of public housing residents have changed and because people have
nowhere else to go to frod affordable housing." NAHRO REPORT, supra note I, at 1.
HUD data shows that as of 1992 the gross household income for households living
in family public housing developments was $7,394 per year. BASIC FACfS, supra note
5, at 3. In 1991,57% ofpublic housing households had incomes only between 10% and
30% of the metropolitan area's median income. [d. at 4.
20. BASIC FACfS, supra note 5, at 4.
21. NAHRO REPORT, supra note I, at 6.
22. One estimate is that in 1987 nearly three-fourths of the approximately 7.5
million rental households with incomes then below the poverty line did not live in public
housing or other subsidized rental housing. Michael A. Wolf, BUD and Housing in the
199Os: Crisis in Affordability and Accountability, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 545, 551
(1991). In addition, many homeowners have incomes below the poverty line but do not
receive housing subsidies. ARLENE ZARBMBKA, THE URBAN HOUSING CRISIS, SOCIAL,
ECONOMIC, AND LEGAL ISSUES AND PROPOSALS 1 (1990). Also, it is estimated that
750,000 persons are homeless on a typical night. Anthony Downs, Creating More
Affordable Housing, 49 J. HOUSING 174 (1992). Moreover, there is a growing shortage
of low-rent private housing, as many such units have been removed from the market or
their rents raised substantially. Id.; Wolf, supra at 548-52. This has caused some
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Federal financial assistance to government sponsored public housing
has changed over time. Initially, federal aid consisted only of principal
and interest payments on local public housing authority long-term bonds,
the bonds being issued to pay for land use acquisition and building
construction costs. Operating and maintenance costs were paid for by
tenant rents. In the early days of public housing, tenants were somewhat
better off financially than those of later years and could pay rents
sufficient to carry the non-debt service costs of the projects. Many
tenants, during the Depression of the thirties, were middle-class people
suffering temporary reverses.23 However, the 1949 Housing Act passed
by Congress effectively limited public housing to the very poor in most
instances.24 This ultimately meant relatively lower rents that, together
with the higher upkeep and repair costs as the housing stock aged, resulted
in need for more federal help as rentals no longer could cover operating
and maintenance costs. Rentals from many tenants also declined
considerably when in 1969 Congress placed a cap on public housing rents
at twenty-five percent of a tenant's total income,2S later raised to thirty
percent, with some exceptions.26 Thirty percent of total income is widely
considered to be the most that low-income persons should spend on
housing without risking extreme deprivation in their overall living
standards, and some have such low incomes that even thirty percent is
more than they can afford.
Congress has recognized the financial squeeze on local public housing
authorities by supplementing initial capital cost assistance with subsidies
for operating costs27 and major repair and modernization expenditures.
Subsidies for operating costs started modestly in 1961 and were increased
homelessness and has also resulted in many poor people, although living in decent
housing, having to pay an unduly high percentage of their income on rent, thereby
requiring sacrifices on other essentials of living.
23. "Millions of the new poor were culturally members ofthe middle class who had
fallen from economic grace after 1929 . . . . As a whole, these people were better
equipped to demand measures of alleviation than the lowest group of the urban poor
before or since ..•• In the period ofpostwar prosperity, public housing lost most of its
middle-class clientele." FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 15.
24. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, §§ 301-302,63 Stat. 422-24 (1949).
25. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-152, § 213(a),
83 Stat. 379, 389 (1970).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. 1992). Currently the mean rent in
public housing is $170 per month, and rents now cover about 46% of operating costs.
BASIC FACTS, supra note 5, at 2.
27. Operating expenses include mostly utilities, ordinary maintenance (upkeep and
minor repairs), administration, and insurance. NAHRO REPoRT, supra note 1, at 34.
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substantially thereafter.28 They now total over $2 billion annually,29
and cover about one-third ofmost housing authorities' operating expenses,
but over half of such expenses are incurred by the largest housing
authorities.so It is much more expensive per unit to operate public
housing in big cities than in smaller communities, but the per unit rental
income for big city public housing is about the same as that for public
housing elsewhere.31 Since 1975, Congress also has made funds available
for major repairs and modernizing of project buildings.32 These funds
have varied considerably year by year, increasing in 1993 to $3.1 billion
annually.33 The need has escalated rapidly as buildings have aged and
many needed repairs deferred. The cost to modernize the public housing
stock has been estimated at between $14 billion and $29 billion.34 As
with operating costs, the per unit cost to modernize big city public housing
is considerably higher than the per unit modernization cost of public
housing elsewhere.3s
The primary objective of public housing has been to provide decent
housing to poor people at rentals they can afford. But other objectives
have also existed and have helped broaden political support for public
housing programs. In depression or recession periods, if major new
additions to the public housing stock were seriously being considered, the
argument was advanced that the added jobs and other outlays needed to
build the new projects would help revive the economy locally and even
nationally and also provide work relief for unemployed construction
28. BRAIT, supra note 1, at 58-59.
29. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437g(c) (Supp. 1994).
30. NAHRO REPORT, supra note 1, at 33-35.
31. See id.
32. Funding to improve the physical condition of existing public housing is
authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
33. BASIC FACTS, supra note 5, at 2. In addition, in 1992, $200 million was
earmarked for major reconstruction of obsolete projects, and in 1993, $300 million for
severely distressed public housing. [d.
34. Schill, Distressed Public Housing, supra note 1, at 501. A 1985
Congressionally mandated study estimated the cost at $21 billion. NAHRO REPORT,
supra note 1, at 21. Deferred physical maintenance has contributed to a substantial
vacancy rate in many public housing projects, and mismanagement allegedly is a
contributing reason for some projects not being properly maintained. See Kinnaird,
supra note 9, at 967-70.
35. One study estimates the average per unit modernization cost of public housing
operated by the largest authorities to be about $27,000 but only about $10,500 for public
housing operated by the smallest authorities. NAHRO REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.
HeinOnline -- 39 N. Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 380 1994
380 NEW YORK I..4W SCHOOL I..4W REVIEW [Vol. 39
workers.36 Moreover, new public housing projects can help eliminate
substandard slum housing, as new public housing projects often are built
on sites previously occupied by substandard housing structures.37 Public
housing also is seen as a potential means of reducing racial segregation,
given the power ofpublic housing authorities to select sites, using eminent
domain when needed, and the authorities' power to select tenants.38
Whether located in central cities or elsewhere, public housing has
always been controversial, with powerful supporters and opponents.39
It has generally been strongly supported by politicians from districts with
many poor people, by citizen action groups that seek to further interests
of the poor, and by those in the government bureaucracy that manage and
provide services to public housing projects. Construction trade unions
have often been very favorable to public housing. However, much of the
broader popular support that the public housing concept originally had has
disappeared as the projects have commonly come to be seen as centers of
crime and violence, often perceived as poorly managed and run-down and
requiring wasteful expenditures of taxpayer moneys. Private real estate
interests have for the most part always been opposed to public housing as
unfair and threatening competition. Conservative business and political
groups have opposed such housing, earlier labeling it as socialism, more
36. On earlier objectives of the public housing program see FISHER, supra note 1,
ch.8.
37. Slum clearance has been a government public housing objective since the
Housing Act of 1937. That act makes reference to aiding slum clearance projects, and
in its Declaration of Policy, retained to the present time, states as the government's
policy "to remedy the unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage
of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families oflow income •••• tt 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437 (1988).
38. This is implicit, for example, in the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1968 that
prohibits racial discrimination, among other forms of discrimination, in all federally
assisted housing, public housing included. Pub. L. 90-284, §§ 802-803, 82 Stat. 73, 81-
83 (1969) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602-3604 (1988». On other efforts
to use public housing as a means of reducing racial segregation, see infra note 56.
39. On the friends and enemies ofpublic housing, see FISHER, supra note 1, at 19-
22; Jewel Bellush & Murray Hausknecht, Public Housing: The Contexts ofFailure, in
URBAN Renewal: People, Politics, and Planning 457-60 (Jewel Bellush & Murray
Hausknecht eds., 1967). Bellush and Hausknecht note the ambivalence of organized
labor to public housing. Interest groups actively involved in pushing for or against the
public housing program in its formative years are also discussed by Marc A. Weiss, The
Origins and Legacy ofUrban Renewal, in FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY AND PROGRAMS:
PAST AND PREsENT, ch. 15 (J. Paul Mitchell ed., 1990). In addition, Weiss considers
how public housing and urban renewal issues were interrelated in the political
maneuvering over public housing and urban renewal legislation during the 1930s to
1950s. ld.
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recently as the inevitable reflection of the inefficiencies of government
ownership. The Reagan and Bush administrations were negative on the
public housing idea and this adversity carried over to the top officials in
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the
department responsible for administering federal participation in the public
housing program. Moreover, the Clinton Administration, in its efforts to
adapt to aggressive conservative forces in Congress following the 1994
election, has become increasingly critical of public housing.
Some critics ofpublic housing take the position that there is a need for
government housing assistance to the poor, but that public housing is too
costly to the federal government and helps too small a percentage of those
in need. 4O It would be better, it is asserted, if federal funds spent on
public housing were distributed more widely and in other ways than
building and operating government-owned rental housing. The private
sector, these critics usually add, should also be more extensively involved
in housing the poor, as it is more efficient.41
The federal government has long been involved in a variety of
financial aid efforts to help the private sector provide more affordable
housing to more people.42 Most of these efforts have benefited
moderate-income home buyers or tenants, but a few of these many federal
housing aid programs have also been directed at helping the poor. The
poor who have benefited, however, have been mostly those with incomes
exceeding what is typical of public housing tenants. However, one
40. See infra note 52.
41. This view is vigorously asserted in Kinnaird, supra note 9, where it is
recommended that much ofthe public housing stock be sold to private interests at market
prices and that housing assistance to the poor increasingly be through rent vouchers. The
lack of efficiency in public housing is also of major concern to Schill. See Schill,
Distressed Public Housing, supra note 1, at 535-38. But irrespective of the efficiency
argument, some take the position that public housing tenants need the greater leasehold
protection available to them over what they would receive as tenants in private housing,
even with very substantial government rental subsidies of their private dwellings. See,
e.g., Shelby D. Green, The Public Housing Tenancy: Variations on the Common Law
that Give Security ofTenure and Control, 43 CATH. U. L. REv. 681 (1994).
42. On federally aided housing programs directed at the private sector, see BRAIT,
supra note 1, 86-103; ANTHONY DOWNS, FEDERAL HOUSING SUBSIDIES: How ARE
THEY WORKING (1973); FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY AND PROGRAMS: PAST AND
PREsENT (J. Paul Mitchell ed., 1985); George Sternlieb & David Listokin, A Review of
National Housing Policy, in HOUSING AMERICA'S POOR, 14, 14-44 (peter D. Salins 00.,
1987); Rachel G. Bratt, Federal Constraints and Retrenchment in Housing: The
Opportunities and Limits ofState and Local Governments, 8 J .L. & POL. 651, 651-72
(1992). Some states also have programs to aid the private sector in providing more
affordable housing. See id. at 672-81; Theodore C. Taub, The Future ofAffordable
Housing, 22 URB. LAW. 659,660-75 (1990).
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program in particular, the so-called Section 8 program, has channeled aid
through the private sector but includes among its beneficiaries a substantial
number of persons in the public housing income range.43
Section 8 is principally a rent supplement program, with the federal
government providing funds to pay much of each qualifying tenant's rent
in privately owned housing.44 The rent subsidy is the difference between
the fair market rental of the housing and the amount that the tenant can
afford to pay, the tenant's share usually being thirty percent of the tenant's
monthly income. Subsidy payments are made directly to the landlords.
Tenant eligibility requirements are similar to those for public housing.
Landlords who choose to participate must agree to the governmental
restrictions imposed and must rent properties that the program
43. On the Section 8 Program, see CHARLES E. DAYE lIT AL., HOUSING AND
COMMUNITYDEVBLOPMBNT: CASES AND MATERIALS 143-52 (2d ed. 1989); Fred Fuchs,
Introduction to HUD Conventional Public Housing, Section 8 Existing Housing, Voucher,
and Subsidized Housing Programs, Part II, 2S CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 990 (1991);
Mahlon R. Straszheim, The Section 8 Rental Assistance Program: Costs and Policy
Options, in HOUSING POllCY FOR THE EIGlITlES 169 (Dale R. Marshall & Roger
Montegomery eds., 1979); U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., PARTICIPATION
AND BENBFITS IN THE URBAN SECfION 8 PROGRAM (1991).
Although benefiting far fewer tenants than public housing and Section 8 programs,
the housing efforts of community development corporations, many of which the federal
government has helped fund, are an increasingly significant form of poverty-level
housing. Community development corporations are non-profit private organizations that
now are operating in many inner-city communities throughout urban America. They are
mostly small and neighborhood-centered,and not only construct, rehabilitate, and operate
housing, but many of them also provide job training, social services, and neighborhood
economic development as well. About half their outside funding aid nationwide comes
from federal, state, and local government, the remainder mostly from a variety of
charitable sources, including foundations and large corporations. On these organizations,
see MICHAEL A. STEGMAN & J. DAVID HOLDEN, NONFBDERAL HOUSING PROGRAMS,
How STATES AND LOCALITIES ARB RESpONDING TO FEDERAL CUTBACKS IN Low-
INCOME HOUSING, 97-139 (1987); AVIS C. VIDAL, REBUILDING COMMUNITIES: A
NATIONAL STUDY OF URBAN COMMUNITY DBVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS (1992). For
a proposal that control over public housing be turned over to community development
corporations, see Peter W. Salsich, Jr., A Decent Homefor Every American: Can the
1949 Goal Be Met?, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1619, 1642-43 (1993).
44. The Section 8 program was established by the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437 (1988 & Supp. 1992».
Recently, Congress provided for a block grant program, the so-called HOME
program, that in some respects is similar to the Section 8 Program. Among other
purposes, the HOME Program makes some funding available for affordable rental
housing assistance to low-income and very low-income families. The funding assistance,
however, is channeled through local or state governments. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12741 & 12742
(Supp. 1992).
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administrators consider acceptable. Local public housing authorities
handle much of the administrative detail of the Section 8 program. The
program was initiated by the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974, and has been through many permutations since it was first set up.
It earlier included a new construction and substantial rehabilitation
component that provided financial assistance to builders of new housing,
privately owned, for rental to low-income people. But the main thrust of
the program has been rent subsidies for tenants of existing housing.
Tenants in almost three million housing units are now receiving Section
8 rental housing assistance,4S and federal government assistance for
Section 8 housing currently is about fourteen billion dollars a year.46
The Section 8 Program makes perfectly clear that workable federally
funded programs of rental housing assistance to poor people, including the
very poor, are possible without government ownership and operation of
the dwelling units. This approach, however, is costly, requires extensive
and expensive government administration, and, as is true of most all
federal poverty aid programs, is subject to sharp shifts in control formats,
including the amounts of monetary aid.
If, as Section 8 demonstrates, it is feasible for the federal government
effectively to provide housing aid to many very poor people by channeling
that aid through the private sector, does this mean that other forms of
federal housing assistance should be substituted for the public housing
approach and that existing public housing should be privatized? Would
housing aid cost to the federal government thereby be reduced and would
better quality housing in a better environment then be available to the
income level of poor people now living in public housing? During the
Bush Administration, Secretary Kemp of HUn thought so. He strongly
promoted housing aid to the poor channeled into private housing and
advocated the sale of existing public housing to existing tenants.47 This
drew support but also strong opposition. Opponents argued that many
public housing tenants would not want to purchase; few such tenants could
afford to do so except on terms that would amount to a near give-away of
45. In 1990, tenants in 2.5 million housing units were being subsidized by Section
8 rental housing assistance. 1993 Statistical Abstract of the United States, Table 583. As
of 1994, it was 2.8 million units. Interview with HUD official.
46. In FY 1994, Section 8 housing assistance was $14.1 billion, but approximately
10% of this was for non-rental subsidies. Interview with HUD official.
47. See, e.g., Jack Kemp, A Homeownership Challenge, 48 J. HOUSING 7 (1991),
(responding to Congressman Clay's opposition to the sale of public housing to low-
income families in William L. Clay, Don't Sell Public Housing, 47 J. HOUSING 189
(1990».
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the estimated $70 billion government investment in public housing;48 and
before they could be sold, most units would need expensive rehabilitation.
Furthermore, it was argued, the most likely buyers would be the most
financially reliable tenants, thereby adversely affecting the remaining
public housing projects by drawing away some of their best, most stable
tenants. Also, most sales likely would be of the better units, including
many scattered-site single family and duplex dwellings, with the result that
some of those unable to buy would be deprived of more desirable units. 49
A HUD sponsored demonstration to test out the privatization concept
largely verified the arguments of those opposed to public housing
privatization. In this demonstration effort, carried out during the late
19808, seventeen cooperating public housing authorities in different
regions offered a total of over 1,300 public housing units for sale to
existing public housing tenants. Terms and procedures varied
considerably among the participating local authorities, but results were
genera~ disappointing, as sales went slowly and many units remained
unsold. Despite the discouraging results of the demonstration,
Congress passed the National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 that
includes au~orization for home ownership sales of some public housing
units. The act authorizes local nonprofit entities, under HUD regulations
and with HUD funding, to take over public housing projects, renovate
them, and sell the units to existing residents or others. Progress is being
made toward sale of a modest number of units pursuant to this
48. For an estimate that the government investment in public housing totals $70
billion, see COUNcn. OF LARGE PuB. HOUSING AurHS., PuBLIC HOUSING TODAY 7 (rev.
~. 1988).
49. For a discussion on the merits of public housing privatization, see Schill,
Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance, supra note 1; William M. Rohe &
Michael A. Stegman, Public Housing Home Ownership: Will it Work andfor lWIom?,
58 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 144 (1992). Schill, in his excellent treatment of the subject, also
takes the position that a federal requirement mandating public housing sales to tenants
at deep discounts from fair market value and against the wishes of public housing
authority owners would lead to unconstitutional takings and possibly unconstitutionally
impair the public authorities' contractual rights as well. See Schill, Privitizing Federal
Low Income Assistance, supra note I, at 928-48. A similar Fifth Amendment takings
position is adopted in Megan Glasheen & ChristopherHornig, Public Housing A.uthorities
and Hope 1: May HUD Give Away lWlat It Doesn't Own?, 25 URB. LAw. 69 (1993).
50. For an evaluation of this public housing homeownership demonstration, see
Rohe & Stegman, supra note 49 (providing a summary of the Public Housing
Homeownership Demonstration of the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, April 1990). An earlier program of public housing unit sales to tenants
had similar disappointing results. See Kinnaird, supra note 9, at 974-75.
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authorization.51
Whether existing federally assisted public housing should be privatized
is a somewhat different issue from whether additional such housing should
be built. One position is that the existing stock of public housing should
be retained under government ownership and operation but little or no
additional public housing should be built. Government disposition of the
present public housing stock by sale to tenants or others, according to this
position, would be too much of a net government financial sacrifice and
would be too disruptive of the lives of most present public housing
tenants. However, construction of new public housing arguably is unduly
expensive, and unbuilt housing obviously lacks tenants whose lives can be
disrupted. Moreover, the argument goes, it is now cheaper and better for
the government to assist in housing the poor, including those in the public
housing income range, by providing financial help to house them in
privately owned and operated housing than in new government owned
units.52 This seems to be a widely adhered to position today, both in
51. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437aaa to 1437aaa-8 (Supp. 1992). The public housing
disposition program is known as HOPE-I. For an attack on both public housing and
HOPE-1, see Kinnaird, supra note 9. As of late 1994, about $100 million had been
approved by the federal government for the HOPE-1 program and 29 grantees had been
approved for implementation grants. Many of the housing units will be renovated prior
to offering them for sale. Interview with a HUD official.
52. E.g., Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Assistance, supra note 1, at 900-
13. But Schill also is of the opinion that more distressed public housing should be
demolished and those persons displaced assisted by other demand-oriented subsidies. Id.
at 498.
A unique approach to housing the poor is proposed by Irving Welfeld, a long-time
HUD employee and a nonconformist on many housing issues. He believes that the
federal government should provide housing assistance to more poor people than it now
does, and a feasible way of doing so is reducing the dollar amount of federal help per
family. At the same overall cost to the government, more poor people could be helped
by spreading aid more broadly but more thinly. The aim should be to provide the poor
with decent housing, as opposed to average housing which has so frequently been the
aim in the past. Also, federal aid should vary with how much of its income a family is
willing to spend on housing: no aid if it spends less than 20 percent of its income on
housing, no additional aid if it spends over 35 percent of its income on housing, and
varying shares in aid for amounts in between. The percentage share of housing cost to
the poor covered by federal assistance should be greatest for those spending 2S percent
of their income on housing. Welfeld argues that not only can this aid formula reduce
federal cost per family for housing assistance, thereby enabling more families to be
helped, but it also will enhance pressure by the poor on their landlords to hold down
rentals. Welfeld favors making public housing landlords and tenants subject to this same
aid formula, thereby forcing public housing to be more competitive and efficient.
WELFBLD, supra note 1, at 247-61; and Irving Welfeld, Poor Tenants, Poor Landwrds,
Poor Policy, 92 THE PuB. INTEREsT 110 (1988).
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terms of how public housing is perceived on the merits and in terms of
what approaches are likely to prevail in the political arena. There are of
course those who disagree with this position: some preferring elimination
of most all government owned public housing,53 and others favoring not
only government retention of the present public housing stock but adding
substantially to it.54 One difficulty in evaluating the relative merits of
public housing and government aided private housing for the poor is the
lack of sufficiently reliable cost data for making comparisons. Much of
the cost data available is too old or too biased to be accurate indicators of
current costs. There is the added uncertainty, important in any
comparison, of what realistic political and administrative prospects there
are for modifying either approach so as to increase its efficiency and
reduce its cost without impairing the quality of housing provided.
Although much of the controversy over public housing has centered
on costs of the program to the federal government and possibilities of
reducing those costs by shifting federal housing assistance for the poor to
other forms of housing aid, the public housing controversy has not been
restricted to cost issues. Racial segregation, that characterizes so much
public housing, also has been a controversial issue. Not only are many
multi-unit public housing projects, including many of the very large ones,
occupied entirely or nearly so by persons of one race, but projects
commonly are located in much larger urban communities similarly
segregated by race.55 Opponents of segregation stress that public
housing, with its potential for breaking down racial segregation, instead
has been used as a means of furthering it, with all the heightened
animosities and reduced job and educational opportunities that accompany
racial segregation. Some legislative and judicial moves have been made
to reduce racial segregation in public housing projects, but many projects
remain segregated.56 The basic reason for this continued segregation is
53. See, e.g., Kinnaird, supra note 9.
54. E.g., BRAIT, supra note 1, at 82-85; Connedy, supra note 1, at 150.
55. On racial segregation in public housing, see sources cited supra note 16.
56. Congress has taken some less than fully effective steps to eliminate racial
discrimination and segregation in housing, most notably by passage of fair housing
legislation in 1968, 1988, and 1992, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619,
3631 (1988 & Supp. 1992». On the effectiveness of this legislation, see James A.
Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of1988: The Second Generation ofFair
Housing, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1049 (1989). Possible tactics for desegregating public
housing projects are discussed in Ted R. Miller & Mildred DePallo, Desegregating
Public Housing: Effective Strategies, 43 J. HOUSINO 9 (1986). This study was fmanced
by HUD and directed principally to local public housing agencies. The authors note that
there have been few examples ofvoluntary desegregation action and that: "an integration
initiative can be politically dangerous in many jurisdictions, since it risks making enemies
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simple: opposition to residential racial integration is pervasive and intense
and the bias by whites against typical public housing minority residents is
particularly strong. This makes it politically difficult to locate minority
occupied public housing in white neighborhoods, and white flight may
well result if such placements occur. Similar biases can surface among
project residents if attempts are made to integrate projects racially. Nor
out of some of those involved." Id. at 18.
Limitations on courts as institutions for desegregating public housing are well-
illustrated by the Gautreaux cases, which after more than twenty years of federal court
litigation, political maneuvering, and administrative compromise have achieved only
modest housing desegregation. The cases arose in the Chicago area. One case was
against the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and sought to reduce segregation in public
housing administered by CHA, especially by requiring small-scale scatter-site housing
for black families in largely white communities. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth.,
296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. m. 1969),304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. m. 1969). The court
ordered the CHA to provide scatter-site public housing. However, due to procrastination
by CHA and other city officials, little such housing has been provided. The other
Gautreaux case was against HUD. The result was aggressively contested, and at one
stage went to the United States Supreme Court. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284
(1976). The Supreme Court held in favor of plaintiffs opposing HUD. An agreement
was reached whereby public housing and public housing-eligible families in Chicago
would be entitled to Section 8 rental subsidy housing at various locations throughout the
Chicago area, including the suburbs. Pursuant to this agreement, 4,500 low-income
black families out of a qualifying pool of 40,000 families, have been relocated, a
majority ofthem to predominantly white middle-class suburbs. On the Gautreaux cases,
see Alexander Polikoff, Gautreaux and Institutional Litigation, 64 Cm.- KENT L. REv.
451 (1988); Leonard Rubinowitz, Metropolitan Public Housing DesegregationRemedies:
Chicago's Privatization Program, 12 No. ILL. U. L. REv. 589 (1992); A. Dan Tarlock,
Remedying the Irremediable: The Lessons of Gautreaux, 64 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 573
(1988). Professor Tarlock, in his article, takes the position that the law of judicial
remedies, even when constitutional questions are involved, should recognize that there
are limitations on what courts can accomplish, and that responsibility on many issues
rests principally with a community's political institutions, no matter how imperfect and
corrupt they may be. Id. at 583-84. The inference is that the long and involved history
of the Gautreaux cases, marked by dilatory and evasive tactics, and accomplishing
relatively little, is the result of courts being asked to do the impossible: reform a local
system when prevailing local views and the political power structure are strongly opposed
to the reform.
Racial quotas, that might be a workable means of integrating public housing, have
been held unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. See, e.g., Burney v. Housing
Auth. of County of Beaver, 551 F. Supp. 746 (W.O. Pa. 1982), vacated on other
grounds, 735 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1984), noted in 28 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L.
397 (1985). For arguments in favor of a race-conscious public housing integration plan
that would not be an illegal quota, see Dale J. Lois, Note, Racial Integration in Urban
Public Housing: The Method is Legal, The Time Has Come, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv.
349 (1989). On racial desegregation and federal housing policies, see HOUSING
DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY, supra note 16, at 197-326 (1986).
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is prejudice exclusively that of whites against nonwhites. Nonwhites may
be opposed and resent movement of other racial or ethnic groups than
their own into largely or entirely nonwhite public housing projects.
Discrimination based on race has declined sharply in many job, school,
public facility, and recreational settings but it remains virulent in housing,
especially housing for the poor.
Race has not been the only controversial issue concerning who should
live in public housing. Differences have emerged over other selection
criteria, and grounds for terminating tenancies have also been contentious.
Ithas generally been agreed that public housing should be for poor people,
but there has been disagreement over how poor.57 Some believe that the
. resident population of public housing should include more regularly
employed working poor and fewer chronically unemployed, as this would
help the housing authorities financially, and because the working poor
with steady jobs are likely to be good role models for other tenants.
However, despite federal statutory requirements for an income mix in
public housing, many projects have relatively few working poor residents
but a high proportion of residents who are very poor.58 There also are
those who are of the opinion that problem families in public housing
should be dealt with more strictly and more of them evicted, especially if
unduly disturbing to neighbors or if family members engage in serious
illegal activity on the premises, such as vandalism or drug dealing.59
57. On public housing tenant selection criteria, see STRUYK, supra note 1, at 105-
10.
58. Income-mix requirements for public housing were imposed by the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383 § 201(a)(3), 88 Stat. 633,
654-655 (requiring that at least 20 per cent of certain dwelling units be occupied by
"very low-income families"). Further statutory modifications were made, the latest in
1992, limiting mandatory &dmission preferences for the very poor to fifty percent of a
public housing authority's housing stock. Housing and Community Development Act of
1992,42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4) (Supp. 1992). For an evaluation of the tenant selection
provisions of the 1974 act, with special reference to the experience ofone city, see Ellen
Gesmer, Discrimination in Public Housing Under the Housing and Community
Development Act of1974: A Critique ofthe New Haven Experience, 13 URB. L. ANN.
49 (1977).
59. E.g., Atlas & Dreier, supra note 1, at 28-33. The term "problem family" or
"problem tenant" is ambiguous. A lengthy list ofpossible criteria emerged when public
housing managers in one big city were interviewed as to whom they considered problem
tenants. The list included breaking rules set by management; property damage; chronic
rent arrears; health problems, such as senility and alcoholism; criminal or antisocial
activity ofany family member, such as theft, assault, narcotics violations, and vandalism;
chronic interpersonalproblems, such as harassmentofneighbors and others, conffict over
child control, and racial or ethnic conffict; sanitation related practices, such as
housekeeping problems severe enough to concern neighbors; and nuisance behavior,
HeinOnline -- 39 N. Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 389 1994
1994] GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF URBAN LAND USE 389
One way to reduce the possible need for stricter eviction practices is
more rigorous screening at the admission stage, which would exclude
many problem families from public housing residency early-on.ro This
approach has received some support. 61
There are obvious, if not entirely satisfactory, answers to these tenant
selection and exclusion arguments. For instance, while the working poor
can usually find decent housing in the private housing market, many of the
chronically unemployed cannot, so more working poor in public housing
will probably mean more chronically unemployed becoming homeless or
living in very substandard premises. As to stricter eviction standards, if
excluded from public housing, where will problem families go? Will
many of them, too, become homeless? And should those in problem
families who are not engaged in deviant behavior be evicted because of the
conduct of those family members whose behavior is unacceptable?
Arguably, the present lenient eviction practices followed by many local
public housing authorities are defensible, and the disturbing and disturbed
residents of public housing are first and foremost the responsibility of the
police or social workers, not public housing landlords.
Another controversial public housing issue has been management:
how should public housing be managed and what should be done about
management shortcomings?62 Public housing is a difficult resource to
manage, as adequate funding for operation and maintenance is not always
assured; the divided responsibility between local government and HUD
complicates administration and can lead to friction over policies; and the
tenant population includes many with special needs or who create serious
problems for both their neighbors and for management. In addition, there
has been corruption in some local authorities and others have been highly
including loud and disruptive music, parties, and domestic quarrels. RICHARD s.
SCOBIE, PROBLEM TENANTS IN PuBLIC HOUSING, WHO, WHERE, AND WHY ARE THEY?,
53-54 (1975). A surprising result of the Scobie study was how few tenants were
categorized as problems using any of the housing managers' criteria other than rule
breaking. The per project percentage of problem tenants ranged only between 2.2 and
4.1 percent. ld. at 62. But note that the study was conducted in the early 1970s.
60. For recommendations as to better screening practices and, as well, housing
authority marketing efforts to attract better tenants, see Raymond J. Struyk & Jennifer
L. Blake, Selecting Tenants: The Law, Markets, and PHA Practices, 40 J. HOUSING 8
(1983). In seeking a desirable pool of tenants, Struyk and Blake suggest that housing
authorities consider not only economic and demographic factors but also such tenant
behavior characteristics as prompt payment of rent, control of children, absence of
criminal activity, and reasonable use of the premises. ld. at 11.
61. E.g., Struyck & Blake, supra note 60.
62. On public housing management, see BRAIT, supra note 1, at 67-70; FRmDMAN,
supra note 1, at 131-46; see generally STRUYK, supra note 1, at 99-177 (discussing in
detail public housing management).
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inefficient, political patronage being a contributing factor in some
instances.63 Nor has HOD been entirely free of internal corruption and
scandal.64 Moreover, many local public housing administrators reputedly
have been insensitive to tenant complaints and legitimate tenant interests,
particularly distressing to a tenant population that generally lacks the same
freedom to move elsewhere enjoyed by most tenants. 6S
HOD has undertaken a series of initiatives to improve management of
local public housing authorities, such as training courses for project
managers, adding funds to projects in greatest need to enable management
to make operational and repair improvements, and encouraging further
participation of tenants in management. Most of these initiatives have
been short-term demonstration efforts involving a limited number of
selected projects or authorities. As demonstrations, they were not
sustained or expanded, and inadequacies in how they were designed and
evaluated restricted their informational value.66 The idea of tenant
involvement in management has attracted considerable support, and public
housing resident associations and councils are common, as are tenant
residents on the governing boards of housing authorities.67 Tenant
management corporations, controlled and largely staffed by public housing
tenants, have been formed in a small number of cities and contract to
manage public housing projects for their local public housing
authorities.68 No doubt, organizations of public housing tenants can help
ease landlord-tenant tensions in public housing projects, but it is unlikely
that any but a relatively few public housing projects will ever be run by
63. On PHA corruption, see Kinnaird, supra note 9, at 971-72.
64. See IRVING WELFELD, HUD SCANDALS, HOWLING HEADLINES AND SILENT
FIAscoES (1992); Wolf, supra note 22, at 553-67.
65. Onpublic housing tenants' perceptionsofmanagement's responsivenessto tenant
needs, see STRUYK, supra note 1, at 127-29. It has also been claimed that the special
needs of the elderly in public housing are being largely ignored. Paul R. Votto, Elderly
Housing: The Shame of the Public Housing Profession, 45 J. HOUSING 266 (1988).
"Most public housing senior projects are nothing more than warehouses of the poor and
frail." ld. at 268.
66. On the initiatives, see STRUYK, supra note 1, at 135-61.
67. NAHRO REPORT, supra note 1, at 9-10. To date, most resident-management
efforts have resulted in only token tenant influence. Atlas & Dreier, supra note 1, at 33.
68. On tenant management corporations, see Robert Kolodny, The Emergence of
Self-Help as a Housing Strategy for the Urban Poor, in CRITICAL PERsPECTIVES ON
HOUSING 450-53, 456-61 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 1986); and STRUYK, supra note
1, at 136-61. Congress has recently authorized procedures under which tenants may
apply to have management of distressed public housing projects transferred to tenant
management corporations or other organizations. Housing and Development Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 121, 106 Stat. 3672,3701-3708 (1992).
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tenant groups.
What is likely to be the future of public housing? The need for
decent, affordable housing for the poor will remain and in central cities
will increase considerably if, as seems likely, even more poor people,
including more of the very poor, become central city residents. To help
fill the need, substantial government assistance will still be made available
but there is a question as to how much of this need government will try
to fill and whether the share of government aid going to public housing
will be phased down and even eventually eliminated in favor of assisting
the poor to live in privately owned and operated housing. Estimates of the
relative governmental cost of the two approaches will be important
considerations in the decisions made. There seems little chance that much
of the present stock of public housing will be privatized, as the resultant
investment loss to government would be too great. But gradually, existing
public housing projects will be demolished as deterioration makes it
uneconomical to retain them and the massive funding needed for their
rehabilitation is not forthcoming. Upon demolition, it is uncertain how
much will be replaced and what form any replacements will take, whether
public housing or some type of publicly aided private housing. N;
discussed above, determinations as to the preferred form of additional
government assisted housing for the poor raise quite different cost
considerations from determinations as to whether existing public housing
should be privatized. Moreover, if, as is possible, government eventually
opts to spread its housing aid much more broadly to cover most all the
poor who need housing help, little or no new public housing would be
made available unless government massively expands its total monetary
commitment to housing the poor. This is an improbable possibility, at least
in the near future. Obviously, the per unit cost of public housing to
government is much greater than some of the other conceivable forms of
housing assistance, such as modest rent supplements. Also, as a result of
the recent sharp political shift to the right in Washington, it seems quite
possible that in the years immediately ahead there will be a substantial
reduction in federal government funding of housing for the poor, both
public housing and private sector housing. If this occurs, along with
anticipated cuts in funding of federal health and welfare programs for the
poor, the resulting hardships may be so extensive and severe as to result
eventually in policy reversals and massive new federal funding for housing
those close to or below the poverty line.
Extensive government funding is so essential to public housing that if
the program is to continue at anything close to its present scale of
providing living quarters for millions of poor people, the federal
government must provide most of the funding assistance. The states are
not in the financial position to take over, although some additional state
or even locally funded public housing may be provided, adding a
significant but at most very limited number of new units to the overall
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supply of public housing. Nor are drastic changes likely in how public
housing is managed. The federal government, as principal funder, will
continue to insist on imposing important management standards on local
housing authorities, regardless of how much this is resented by the local
authorities.69 Overall, however, management seems certain to remain
largely a local responsibility. More localities may experiment with new
management arrangements, such as new ways of sharing management
responsibility with tenant groups or contracting out management to private
organizations. But the local housing authority format will probably
continue, with authority personnel performing substantial management
functions for most all projects. In general, local housing authorities have
done a difficult job reasonably well, and they provide valuable local input
in resolving many of the problems inherent in public housing.
Due to the high incidence of violent crime and drug dealing in large
public housing projects and the unfavorable reputations of many large
projects, most of any new public housing built or acquired in the future
will quite likely be scatter-site small complexes of one to a half dozen
dwelling units each. Many of these well may be existing housing that
local housing authorities purchase, including some structures purchased at
tax or mortgage foreclosure sales. The small-complex scatter-site
approach also can make it easier to locate public housing outside existing
low-income neighborhoods and to place minority public housing residents
in predominantly white communities. However, such a scatter-site
approach seems certain to meet strong resistance because of race and class
prejudices and an aversion to public housing being located in most
neighborhoods that now lack such housing.
Public housing has been more of a success than its opponents will
admit. Through the years it has provided decent housing at an affordable
price to many millions of poor people who would otherwise not have been
as satisfactorily housed. However, the public housing program has
encountered difficulties and has always been contentious. Many of its
difficulties are inherent in any effort to provide decent and affordable
housing to poor people, especially the very poor. The program is
particularly important to central cities, where so many poor people reside,
and its difficulties have been particularly visible and acute in large central
city public housing projects. As a concept, public housing remains
69. illustrative of this resentment is the detailed account by a local housing authority
executive director ofwhat he perceives to be unduly burdensomeand inconsistent federal
restrictions on local housing authorities. A.W. "Gus" Kuhn, PHA Management: Are
the Critics Right?, 45 J. HOUSING 67 (1988). At one point Kuhn states: "housing
authorities have become puppets at the hands of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, and it, therefore, becomes highly questionable whether local housing
authorities are really locally owned and operated as envisioned under the Housing Acts
of 1937 and 1949." [d. at 71-72.
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controversial; and its future is uncertain as alternative forms of housing
for the poor attract support and as the federal government, the principal
source of public housing financial assistance, faces serious budgetary
constraints and growing popular antipathy to government funded aid
programs for the poor.
II. URBAN RENEWAL
The urban renewal program, heavily funded by the federal
government, was a major force in American urban affairs for a quarter of
a century.'70 It was terminated in 1974, but in modified form subsequent
government programs have used somewhat similar approaches in efforts
to achieve similar goals. The urban renewal program can be seen as part
of a long continuum of government attempts, through cooperation with the
private sector, to revitalize urban areas, especially central cities.
The principal concern of urban renewal was physical deterioration of
urban areas. Its primary goals were elimination of slums and the
renovation of central business districts.71 To some, notably many land
use planners, comprehensive planning of entire cities became a major
urban renewal goal-the rational restructuring of urban complexes. And
to many mayors and other local government officials, urban renewal was
seen as a means of increasing the property tax base of their cities, an
increase that usually follows from new or extensively renovated structures.
Still other urban renewal goals, in relation to some projects, were
attracting back more upper-income residents to central cities and also
strengthening urban hospitals, universities, and cultural centers by
providing them with expansion space or making their surrounding
70. On urban renewal, see MARTIN ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER, A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF URBAN RENEwAL, 1949-1962 (1964); RICHARD D. BINGHAM,
PUBuc HOUSING AND URBAN RENEWAL, AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL-LOCALRELATIONS
(1975); SUSAN S. FAINSTEIN' ET AL., REsTRUCTURING THE CITY: THE POLmCAL
ECONOMY OF URBAN REDEVELOPMENT (rev. ed. 1986); BERNARDJ. FRIEDEN &LYNNB
B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INc., How AMERICA REBun.DS CITIES 15-60 (1989);
FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 147-172; SCOTT GREER, URBAN RENEwAL AND AMERICAN
CITIES, THE DILEMMA OF DEMOCRATIC INTERVENTION (1965); Weiss, supra note 39,
at 253-74; URBAN RENEwAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY (James Q. WIlson
. ed., 1966); REPORT OF THE NAT. COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBS., supra note 1, pt. 2,
ch. 6; Symposiwn, Urban Renewal, Part 1,25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 631 (1960);
Symposiwn, Urban Renewal, Part 11,26 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1961); Quintin
Johnstone, The Federal Urban Renewal Program, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 301 (1958); Note,
Urban RenewaL' Problems of Eliminating and Preventing Urban Deterioration, 72
HARV. L. REv. 504 (1959).
71. For an analysis of community planning goals of urban renewal, see GREER,
supra note 70, at 180-84.
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neighborhoods safer and more attractive. Although there were some
renewal projects in suburbs and small towns, urban renewal was primarily
directed at central cities.
The typical urban renewal procedure was for a local government
agency to acquire land in need of redevelopment, clear it, and then sell the
vacant land to a private or public developer who would build on it in
accord with a local government plan for reuse. The writedown between
acquisition cost and resale price-the difference in value between the land
acquired improved and sold cleared-plus some administrative costs, were
known as net project costs, and paid for mostly by federal government
grants. In the typical project, however, most of the total cost was paid for
by a private developer who purchased and built on the property. The
usual attraction of renewal sites to private developers was the availability
of large tracts of central city land that the private sector, not having
eminent domain rights, normally could not assemble at a fair price, if at
all. And these tracts normally came as raw land, the developer not having
to pay the value of the prior improvements or the cost of removing them.
In addition, the renewal plan often resulted in an upgrading of the
neighborhood that was beneficial to the developer's project.
In its basic features, urban renewal was simple; in its detailed
operations, of course, it was much more complicated. Many of these
complexities resulted from requirements imposed by federal statutes or
regulations on local public authorities (LPAs), the agencies responsible for
administering the programs at the local level. The LPAs were established
by state enabling acts and their form varied somewhat from state to state,
but many were semi-independent local authorities.on A separate federal
agency, the Urban Renewal Administration, was set up to oversee the
federal government's interests in the program. The program was
established by Title I of a federal statute, the Housing Act of 1949,73 the
same act that was so important to the expansion of public housing. A
72. In some states, the LPAs were the local housing authorities or departments of
city government. On LPAs, see William L. Slayton, The Operation and Achievements
ofthe Urban Renewal Program, in WILSON, supra note 70, at 189, 195.
Many of the state enabling acts were challenged on the grounds that LPA eminent
domain acquisitions, because allegedly not for a public use, were unconstitutional takings
under the federal constitution or relevant state constitutions. A particularly troublesome
question was whether land could validly be taken by government from one private person
for the purpose of transferring it to another private person pursuant to an urban renewal
plan. Almost all the urban renewal acts challenged were, however, upheld as
constitutional, a leading and very influential case being Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954). Also see C. C. Marvel, Annotation, Validity, Construction and Effect of
Statutes Providingfor Urban Redevelopment by Private Enterprise, 44 A.L.R.2d 1414,
1420-21 (1955).
73. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, §§ 101-110, 63 Stat. 413,414-421.
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number of federal statutory changes pertaining to urban renewal were
made in subsequent years, particularly enactments in 195474 and 1968.75
In 1974, with passage of the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974,76 the urban renewal program was replaced by a block grant
scheme allocating federal community development funds more equally and
to more cities, with extensive discretion in each locali~ as to how federal
aid funds were spent and with less federal oversight. Under the 1974
act, localities were entitled to federal funding largely on an entitlement
basis, and the act replaced not only the urban renewal program but also
a number of other programs under which federal funds were distributed
for particular urban land use development projects.78
The urban renewal program not only required that there be federal
approval of each proposed project before federal funding would be
provided, but as a prerequisite to such funding it was also required that
the locality adopt a federally approved workable program. Proper
preparation of a workable program was a major undertaking that required
careful local government determination of needs and strategies for
action.79 Extensive preparatory work also was necessary for each urban
74. Housing Act of 1954, ch. 649, §§ 301-316,68 Stat. 590,622-630.
75. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat.
476.
76. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88
Stat. 633 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992».
77. On the Housing and Community DevelopmentAct of 1974, see Richard DeLeon
& Richard T. LeGates, Community DevelopmentBlock Grants: Redistribution Effects and
Equity Issues, 9 URB. LAW. 364 (1977); and Patricia Harris, Recent Trends in the
Community Development Grant Program, 15 URB. L. ANN. 3 (1978).
78. A total of ten programs were replaced by the Community Development Block
Grant Program. For a listing of these programs see DeLeon & LeGates, supra note 77,
at 369 n.6.
79. The workable program requirement was initiated by the Housing Act of 1954,
ch. 649, § 303, 68 Stat. 590, 623-624. The Housing and Home Finance Agency,
predecessor of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, later established
essential elements of a workable program. These included determination by the locality
of the nature and extent of local slum and blight conditions, a comprehensive plan for
dealing with these conditions, a showing that adequate building and housing codes have
been or shortly will be adopted, acceptance of local responsibility for relocating families
displaced by government activity, a showing of financing needs and funding sources to
accomplish program objectives, the contemplated administrative organization for
implementing the program, and plans for citizen participation in carrying out the
program. Federal approval ofa workable program was also required for federal funding
of public housing. On workable programs, see Charles S. Rhyne, The Workable
Program-A Challengefor Community bnprovement, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 685
(1960); ROBERT C. WEAVER, THE URBAN COMPLEX 95-102 (1964); and F. David
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renewal project. Many of these projects involved large parcels of land,
commonly an entire city block or more, fully improved with residential
or commercial structures. 80 Areas selected for renewal had to be slums
or blighted. An early requirement that renewal sites be predominantly
residential, either before or after renewal, was eased with a number of
exceptions.81 This helped make possible more downtown or near-
downtown store or office building renewal projects. In addition to site
selection, the local public authority had to make determinations as to
ultimate use, cost estimates, and relocation needs. It then was required
to prepare a formal urban renewal plan describing the proposed project
and setting forth its objectives. Once the plan was adopted by the local
governing body, commonly a city council, it would go for approval to the
federal Urban Renewal Administration, the agency responsible for the
federal role in the program. If the Urban Renewal Administration
approved, a contract would be entered into between the local public
agency and the federal government under which the federal government
would agree to pay its share of the net project cost. Thereafter, the land
would be acquired, using eminent domain or the threat of eminent domain
where necessary; present occupants would relocate; any needed site
clearance would take place-and many projects involved total or near-total
clearance; any necessary streets, sewers, or other infrastructure facilities
would be added; the land would be transferred, usually by sale; and
finally, new construction or site rehabilitation would occur in accord with
the project plan. Most dispositions were to private developers but some
were to public entities, including public housing authorities. In some
instances, the entire process took many years; and if an acceptable
developer could not be obtained, the land remained vacant indefinitely. 82
Urban renewal projects resulted in the demolition of an estimated
400,000 dwelling units,83 residents of which, most of them poor people,
had to relocate. In addition, many thousands of businesses, mostly small
enterprises, were forced to move as a result of urban renewal projects.
Clarke, BasisjorMeasuring "Workable Program" Progress, 19 J. HOUSINO 524 (1962).
The emphasis on planning in urban renewal resulted in employment of many city
planners nationally. See Weiss, supra note 39, at 268-70.
80. One District of Columbia project covered 560 acres, almost a square mile.
FRIEDEN & SAOALYN, supra note 70, at 27.
81. On the predominantly residential requirement and its modifications over time,
see Ashley A. Foard & Hilber Fefferman, Federal Urban Renewal Legislation, in
WILSON, supra note 70, at 104-113; and FRIEDEN & SAOALYN, supra note 70, at 22-25.
82. Martin Anderson claimed that the estimated time, as of 1961, for completion of
the typical urban renewal project was twelve years. ANDERSON, supra note 70, at 90.
83. REPORT OF THE NAT. COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBS., supra note 1, at 163.
This estimate was as of 1968.
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Many of these residents and businesses needed relocation help, and the
federal government at a later stage in the program's evolution made
modest cash grants available to relocatees forced to move because ofurban
renewal.84
The major funding contribution of the federal government to urban
renewal was the federal payment, by grant, of two-thirds of net project
costs.as The remaining one-third was the responsibility of local
government and could be met by cash payments or by local government
additions to project areas of such needed public facilities as new streets
and sidewalks. 86 Over the quarter century of federally-aided urban
renewal, there were approximately 2,100 federally approved urban
renewal projects87 in about 1,000 localities.88
Despite its promise and achievements, the urban renewal program
drew extensive criticism and generated a great deal of dissension over its
objectives, the nature and effect of its projects, and whether government
should even be involved in such a program. As one distinguished
commentator observed: "Urban renewal is not the most expensive or the
most far-reaching domestic governmental program of our time, yet it is
one of the most widely discussed and perhaps the most controversial. »89
Persistently the most controversial aspect of the program was how and to
what extent the program should be directed to helping the poor. Was
elimination of slums within renewal areas to be the major benefit to the
poor, assuming this to be a benefit, or was a large volume of new or
84. On government assistance to urban renewal relocatees, see FRIEDEN &
SAGALYN, supra note 70, at 30-37; and Chester Hartman, The Housing of Relocated
Families, in WILSON, supra note 70, at 293,313-15.
85. The federal share was not to exceed three-fourths for projects in cities having
a population of 50,000 or less. 42 U.S.C. § 1468a (1970). For the relative distribution
of all federal funds for net project costs between cities over and under populations of
50,000, see REPoRT OF THE NAT. COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBS., supra note I, at 161.
86. A few states provided state funds to assist their cities in meeting urban renewal
costs. \Villiam L. Slayton, State and Local Incentives and Techniques for Urban
Renewal, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 793, 801-05 (1960).
87. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Statistical Abstract ofthe United States: 1976,
Table 1282 (1976).
88. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., 1974 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 21
(1974). From 1949 to 1975, federal government grant funds reserved for urban renewal
projects totaled $10.1 billion and as of 1974, $6.8 billion in grant funds had been
disbursed. Statistical Abstract, supra note 86, at table no. 282. The urban renewal
program also provided fmancial assistance in the form of federal loans and loan
guarantees; and as of 1975, the total of these commitments outstanding was $4.8 billion.
Budget of the U.S. Gov't, FY 1975, Appendix 503 (1974).
89. WILSON, supra note 70, at xiii.
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rehabilitated housing to be developed for the poor as well, much of it in
renewal areas? Was the principal emphasis of the program to be
redevelopment that aided the poor or was it to be renewing downtown
business districts that thereby would help revitalize cities, benefit business,
and increase property tax yields? This struggle over the primary purpose
of urban renewal was an important feature of the extended prepassage
history of the Housing Act of 1949, the act that launched the urban
renewal program,90 and the struggle continued throughout the life of the
program.
The Housing Act of 1949 was an omnibus act that initially attracted
considerable support from both advocates for the poor and business
interests, as it contained provisions appealing to each of these groups.
Title I of the act provided for slum clearance and urban redevelopment,
and although unclear as to just what the urban renewal reuse emphasis
would be, its terms and its legislative history were subject to
interpretations encouraging to both sides in the struggle over purpose.
Title ill of the act also provided for public housing, very much favored
by advocates for the poor, although strongly disfavored by many business
interests. The act offered enough to each concerned group to enable its
eventual passage.
As it turned out, most urban renewal decisions, including what the
primary purpose of the program should be, were left largely to local and
federal government officials responsible for program administration, who
were influenced by outside developers, private or public, willing to build
on available renewal properties. For the most part, the renewal decisions
made were disappointing to those concerned about the poor. Overall, the
emphasis was heavily on strengthening downtown business areas by
replacing old structures with new office buildings, stores, or middle- and
upper-income housing. Considerable new housing was built on renewal
sites, but much less than what was demolished, and most of the new
housing was for upper- or middle-income residents. 91 Although by
90. Theprepassagestruggle over what becamethe Housing Act of 1949 is described
in Foard & Fefferman, supra note 81, at 79-93. The support and influence of the public
housing lobby in passage of the act are discussed in Weiss, supra note 39, at 270-72.
91. As of 1967, of the approximately 400,000 dwelling units demolished in urban
renewal areas, only about half as many dwelling units had been or were scheduled to be
constructed at the renewal sites. Only about 10 percent of the new dwelling units were
to be public housing and almost two-thirds of them were to be for middle- and upper-
income residents. See REPORT OF THE NAT. COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBS., supra note
1, at 163.
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statute areas scheduled for renewal had to be slums or blighted,92 in
meeting this requirement many renewal sites were selected adjacent to
established downtown commercial areas, thereby enabling geographical
expansion of downtown business districts with office or store building
reuse. Some renewal projects adjacent to downtown areas included
construction of luxury apartment buildings sited to attract high-income
residents by the proximity to downtown.
Not only were those concerned about the poor disappointed with the
prevailing forms of development on urban renewal sites but they were
incensed by the hardships, financial and emotional, encountered by many
residents ofurban renewal areas forced to relocate as the result of renewal
projects.93 Relocatees not only had moving expenses, but there were
emotional hardships in being uprooted from home communities, and the
housing they moved to often was more expensive or otherwise less
satisfactory than what they had left. Minorities, it became evident, were
particularly wlnerable to relocation hardships because of the difficulty
they faced in finding housing elsewhere. It also became evident that
although slums were being cleared, they were not being eliminated; they
were merely being replicated or intensified elsewhere as occupants of
renewal areas shifted locations. Concern was also expressed for the
relocation hardships encountered by the thousands of small businesses
forced by urban renewal to relocate. Not only did these businesses have
moving expenses but many retailers, in particular, suffered extensive good
will losses when forced out of their established locations.
One response of those concerned about the effect ofurban renewal on
the poor was to publicize the program's shortcomings as they saw
them.94 There also was pressure exerted on Congress and relevant
92. Following the Housing Act of 1954, that added the tenn "urban renewal" to the
statutory lexicon (68 Stat. 622), more attention was given to blight removal in selecting
areas to be renewed, blight being a vague concept that included slum housing and other
physically run-down properties that could be rebuilt for a more desirable use. Many, but
not all, nonresidential areas found to be blighted had high incidences of property tax
delinquency, declining property values, and vacancies. The tenn "blight," however, was
capable of being stretched so as to delineate areas with less serious adverse market
characteristics but that might be attractive to developers, especially if cleared. On slum
and blight definitional problems and how these tenns were manipulated in selecting urban
renewal sites, see FRIEDEN & SAOALYN, supra note 70, at 23-24; and GREER, supra note
70, at 29-31.
93. See infra note 94.
94. 1llustrative of the criticism of urban renewal for its impact on housing for the
poor and the cost and trauma it caused relocatees are these commentaries: JOSEPH P.
FRIED, HOUSINO CRISIS U.S.A. 88-94 (1971); Marc Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home:
Psychological Costs ofRelocation, in WasON, supra note 70, at 359-79; FRIEDEN &
SAOALYN, supra note 70, at 29-37; FRIEDMAN, supra note I, at 166-72; REPoRT OF THE
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federal and state government agencies to redirect the program and correct
its perceived deficiencies. There were some limited successes with
Congress. For example, the statutory requirement that renewal projects
be predominantly residential before or after development was retained,
although with some modifications;9s statutory requirements in later urban
renewal years added some low-income housing reuse requirements for
urban renewal areas;96 and, beginning in 1956, the federal government
made payments to residents and smaIl businesses forced to relocate from
urban renewal areas-payments, however, that some critics considered
inadequate.97 Political pressure on local public authorities also was
effective in some instances to shape urban renewal projects more favorably
to the interests of the poor, with organized citizen participation often a
useful tactiC.98
Looking back at the urban renewal program over its quarter-century
history, its principal emphasis generaIly was not on benefiting the poor
through slum clearance and better housing; rather, it was on downtown
business district revival and accompanying increases in city property taxes.
Nor did slum clearance prove to be an effective way of eliminating slums,
as foIlowing clearance, slums tended to move or be intensified elsewhere.
Moreover, urban renewal resulted in substantial net loss of low-income
housing in renewal areas, many close-knit low-income communities were
broken up, and renewal caused substantial hardship to many resident and
business relocatees.
NAT. COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBS., supra note 1, at 167; and Herbert J. Gans, The
Human Implications ofCurrentRedevelopmentand Relocation Planning, 25 J. AM. INST.
OF PLANNERs 15 (1959). But for a less critical analysis of urban renewal relocation, by
a fonner URA official, see Martin Millspaugh, Problems and Opportunities of
Relocation, in Symposium, Urban Renewal, Part II, supra note 70, at 6.
95. On the predominantly residential requirement, see supra note 81.
96. The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 required that a majority of
all subsequently built urban renewal project housing be for low- and moderate-income
families or individuals and at least 20 percent of such housing be for low-income
individuals or families. Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 512, 82 Stat. 476, 524-525.
97. See supra note 84.
98. Citizen participation was strongly encouraged by the workable program. Supra
note 79. On citizen participation in urban renewal, see generally GREER, supra note 70,
at 118-23; and James Q. Wl1son, Planning and Politics: Citizen Participation in Urban
Renewal, in WILSON, supra note 70, at 407. For a case study particularly concerned
with citizen participation in urban renewal projects in one section ofa big city, Chicago's
Hyde Park-Kenwood area, see PETER H. ROSSI & ROBERT A. DENTLER, THE POLmCS
OF URBAN RENEwAL, THE CmCAGO FINDINGS (1961). Compare the experience in
Boston, as described in HERBERT J. GANS, THE URBAN VILLAGERS: GROUP AND CLASS
IN THE LIFE OF ITALIAN-AMERICANS (4th prtg. 1962), and in WaIter McQuade, Urban
Renewal in Boston, in WILSON, supra note 70, at 259, 273.
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Another controversial urban renewal issue was the cost of the program
to the federal government, and especially how much of the net project cost
should be assumed by the federal government and how much by the
localities. The original generally applicable net project cost formula of
two-thirds to be paid by the federal government and one-third by the
localities was retained, although there were attempts within the federal
government to reduce the federal percentage.99 These attempts were
strongly resisted by the localities that claimed, given their needs and
resources, even one-third was an undue burden on them. Indirectly, a
locality's share could be reduced by noncash credits for public facilities
added by the locality that did not exclusively benefit the project area or
would have been provided even without the urban renewal project.
Liberally allowed noncash credits in effect increased the amount ofproject
costs paid by the federal government. Noncash credits and their
manipulation were at times contentious matters. 100
Workable programs also generated controversy. Many local officials
gave only limited attention to this detailed and demanding set of
requirements, considering the workable program a matter of low priority
and a mere formality to receiving federal aid.101 Many localities, for
example, failed to comply with workable program directives to appoint or
convene citizen participation committees or to enact or enforce requisite
housing and other codes. Such neglect of workable program requirements
resulted in federal compliance pressure on a number of localities. 102
There were sharp differences as to how workable programs should be
viewed: as mandatory standards to be rigorously and consistently
enforced nationwide or as means of educating local communities on their
needs and with federal demands made cautiously and adjusted to each
locality's circumstances.103 The workable program issue was further
complicated by uncertainty as to exactly what the program's requirements
meant, and also by doubts about the effects of implementing such a radical
effort at social control as the workable program. Moreover, there were
concerns about possible political backlash against local government
leaders if they adhered rigorously to workable program requirements.
99. Controversy over federal-local sharing of costs is discussed in Foard &
Feffennan, supra note 81, at 113-25.
100. On the noncash credit issue, see id. at 119-24; and ANDERSON, supra note 70,
at 30-34. Anderson claims that nationwide 60 percent of the local share consisted of
noncash credits and that the federal government paid for two-thirds of these. [d. at 33-
34.
101. Rhyne, supra note 79, at 696.
102. WEAVER, supra note 79, at 97-102.
103. On hard line and soft line approaches to workable programs, see GREER, supra
note 70, at 110-13.
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The ultimate and most fundamental urban renewal controversy was
over whether the program merited retention. Opposition eventually
became so strong as to bring about its termination in 1974. Among the
many considerations that led to termination were financial cost of the
program to the federal government; localities' objections to the workable
program requirement and even to federal intervention generally in the
urban renewal process; hardships caused relocatees forced to move from
renewal areas; the length of time it took to complete renewal projects,
indicative ofgross inefficiencies in the process; and inequalities in federal
urban renewal funding allocations, some cities receiving far more than
others of comparable size and with comparable problems, some cities
receiving nothing. Perhaps the most damaging attack on the program was
the widely read and referred to book by Martin Anderson, The Federal
Bulldozer, published in 1964.104 After a lengthy analysis of the
program, Anderson urged its repeal because, he asserted, it was
regressive, costly, benefited high-income groups but hurt low-income
groups, and had negligible results compared to what the private market
could achieve. The gist of his position was that free enterprise is the
answer to the problems urban renewal sought to address, and he concluded
his book by stating: "The federal urban renewal program conceived in
1949 had admirable goals. Unfortunately it has not and cannot achieve
them. Only free enterprise can."lOS This free enterprise position
applied to urban renewal was particularly appealing to conservative
political interests.
Another very troublesome attack on the urban renewal program was
that the decentralized character of American local government limited
substantially what it could achieve. Important to this conclusion is the
obvious fact that metropolitan regions are functional units with many
interdependencies between central cities and their suburbs. The reasoning
then is that these interdependencies are so important that for any
comprehensive government urban renewal efforts to be successful,
cooperation among local governments throughout the region is required,
and yet diversity among these governments as to their perceived interests
makes such cooperation generally impossible. Furthermore, the tradition
in this country of local government autonomy over local affairs is so
104. See ANDERSON, supra note 70. The Anderson book was severely criticized
for its conclusions and the inaccuracy of its data. See, e.g., Robert P. Groberg, Urban
RenewalRealistically Reappraised, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 212 (1960), reprinted
in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY, supra note 70, at 155; and
IsadoreCandeub, "FederalBulldozer IILabeled "Journalis/icRehash IIofOldAn/i-renewal
Arguments, 9 J. HOUSING 473 (1964). And see CHARLES ABRAMS, THE CITY IS THE
FRONTIER 155 n.l (1965).
105. ANDERSON, supra note 70, at 230.
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strong that the federal government lacks effective power to force the
requisite coordinated political action needed for comprehensive urban
renewal. Some spot renewal efforts are possible, such as adding new
subsidized housing for the poor in central cities. Also, with sufficient
government subsidy, urban renewal may provide enough new construction
of taxable properties, commercial or residential, to at least temporarily
strengthen central city property tax bases. But, it is reasoned, renewal
that defies basic underlying trends in how urban regions evolve, how
physical space is allocated, and how political power over urban land use
matters is distributed, cannot be a successful strategy for urban
revitalization.1OO This analysis bears some resemblance to that of Martin
Anderson, but with more stress on urban renewal's political limitations.
Whatever the reasons and however valid the justifications, the urban
renewal program came to an end in the mid-1970s. No equally grandiose
government program for physical revitalization of American urban areas
has since been attempted. The federal government has retained some
interest in revitalizing depressed urban areas through funding help for
renewal-type improvements. Among federal government efforts of this
kind have been community development block grants, under which local
and state government grant recipients could use the funds provided for
urban renewal purposes, among others;101 urban development action
grants, commonly referred to as UDAGs, that allocate federal funds to
distressed urban areas for targeted physical improvements;10S and low-.
income housing tax credits under the income tax that encourage more new
and rehabilitated low-income rental housing, much of this housing certain
to be in distressed inner-city areas.109 But federal government funding
106. This analysis is substantially that of the respected scholar and commentator on
urban renewal, Scott Greer, writing in the 1960s. See particularly GREER, supra note
70, at 125-64, 165-84. Greer adds this further limitation on the potential of urban
renewal: "[Urban renewal's] most intportant limits are, sintply, the limits of our
knowledge...• We do not know enough about the forces producing the metropolis and
we know less of the stratagems that would allow us to control its growth." [d. at 185.
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (1988 & Supp. 1992). On the block grant program, see
Duane A. Martin, The President and the Cities: Clinton's Urban Aid Agenda, 26 URB.
LAw. 99, 124-26 (1994); and Richard S. Williamson, Community Development Block
Grants, 14 URB. LAW. 283 (1982).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 5318 (1988). On UDAGS, see Martin, supra note 107, at 108-
09; and Comment, Urban Development Action Grants: A Housing-Linked Strategy for
Economic Revitalization ofDepressed Urban Areas, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 1469 (1980).
109. 26 U.S.C. § 42 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
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of urban revitalization has declined considerably since the mid-1970s. 110
On a modified scale, some states and cities have continued to engage in
sporadic urban renewal efforts, of particular significance being the
entrepreneurial ventures some states and central cities have entered into
with large business interests to retain or expand local business activity by
building or modernizing central city office buildings, parking garages,
sports complexes, moderate-income housing, and other structures for
which there appears to be market demand. 111 Government involvement
in urban renewal did not end with the federal urban renewal program
termination in 1974, but since then it has been less ambitious and has had
less impact on cities nationwide.
ill. ZONING
Zoning has become the major form of land use and development
regulation imposed by local government in the United StateS.112 Most
municipalities, including all big cities except Houston,113 now have
zoning programs in effect. Although in scope and detail of coverage,
zoning ordinances vary considerably among municipalities, they have
110. On federal government cutbacks in aid to cities, see Peter Dreier, America's
Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solutions, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1351, 1383-1386 (1993)
and Martin, supra note 107, at 100-16.
111. On entrepreneurial urban development projects with local or state government
and private business participation, see John J. Kirlin & Dale R. Marshall, Urban
Governance: The New Politics ofEntrepreneurship, in URBAN CHANOE AND POVERTY
(Michael G.H. McGeary & Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. eds., 1988); Robert H. Freilich &
Brenda L. Nichols, Public/Private Partnerships in Joint Development: The Legal and
Financial Anatomy ofLarge-8cale Urban Development Projects, 1986 INST. ON PLAN.
ZONING & EMlNBNT DOMAIN 1-1 (1986); and Daniel R. Mandelker, Public
Entrepreneurship: A Legal Primer, 15 REAL EST. LJ. 3 (1986).
112. For general coverage ofzoning, see ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW
OF ZONING 3d (1986): RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONINO GA1m: MUNICIPAL
PRACl1CES AND POLICIES (1966); RICHARD F. BABCOCK & CHARLES L. SIEMON, THE
ZONING GAME REVISITED (1985); The Land Use Awakening: Zoning Law in the
Seventies, A.B.A. SEC. OF URB., ST. & Loc. Gov'T L. (Robert H. Freilich and Eric
O. Stuhler eds., 1982); ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES STILL TO KEEP
(Charles M. Haar and Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989); MARTIN A. GARRETT, JR., LAND
USE REGULATION: THE IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE LAND USB RIOlITS (1987); DANIEL
R. MANDBLKER, LAND USE LAW (2d ed., 1988); NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN
LAND PLANNING LAW 329-533 (rev. 1985); REPORT OF THE NAT. COMMISSION ON
URBAN PROBS., supra note 1, pt. 3, ch. 1; Eric H. Steele, Participation and Rules-VIe
Functions ofZoning, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 709 (1986); and Nonnan Williams,
Jr., Planning Law in the 1990's, 31 ARIz. L. REv. 471 (1989).
113. On the zoning situation in Houston, see infra note 139.
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some common characteristics. They regulate land use on a district by
district basis, the same restrictions applying substantially to all land use
parcels within each kind of district, denominated a zone. Typically,
zoning ordinances restrict the kind of land use permitted within each zone,
such as residential, commercial, or industrial, or some subcategory of one
of these principal uses. The height, bulk, and lot location of buildings
within each zone also are usually restricted. It is common today for all
land use in a municipality to be zoned and to be covered by zoning
restrictions. Most modem zoning ordinances are long and complex, with
many amendments or with recent extensive revisions. The ordinances also
normally include an official map delineating zone locations.
Zoning controls generally are prospective only, structures and uses
prohibited by a zoning enactment usually may be retained if in existence
when the provision was passed. But some ordinances require that such
nonconforming features be phased out over time. Zoning also is a form
of regulation, predicated on the police power, and does not provide for
compensation to those with an interest in zoned land use who are
adversely affected by zoning restrictions. Compensation, however, may
be required if the zoning is determined by the courts to be an
unconstitutional taking.
Although zoning is principally a local government form of land use
control, the states also have assumed zoning responsibilities. Each state
has authorized the zoning activities of its municipalities, usually by zoning
enabling acts. In addition, some states have, through legislation, imposed
land use controls that override or supplement local zoning.114 State
courts are active in resolving zoning controversies, and in the course of
doing so, determine the validity of zoning and rezoning actions of local
zoning agencies and rule on the meaning and constitutionality of zoning
enabling acts and ordinances. In many states, zoning cases are among the
most common kinds of cases filed in state courts.
114. On state government use of the zoning power, see 1 ANDERSON, supra note
112, §§ 2.01-2.14. Affordable housing statutes enacted by some states seekto limit local
exclusionary zoning efforts. They include the widely commented on New Jersey Fair
Housing Act of 1985, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-27D301 to 52-27D329, as amended
(West 1986 & Supp. 1994), the New Jersey legislature's response to the Mount Laurel
fair share cases; and the 1969 Massachusetts Low- and Moderate-Income Housing Act,
MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 40B, §§ 20-23, as amended (West 1979 & 1994 Supp.),
often referred to as the anti-snob zoning law. The Massachusetts Act, under some
circumstances, enables a state agency to override local zoning board decisions to block
construction of government subsidized low- or moderate-income housing. For recent
discussions of the New Jersey and Massachusetts statutes, see Colloquium, Mount Laurel
and the Fair Housing Act: Success or Failure?, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 59 (1991); and
Note, Anti-Snob Zoning in Massachusetts: Assessing One Attempt at Opening the
Suburbs to Affordable Housing, 78 VA. L. REv. 535 (1992).
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Zoning as an important means of legal control over land use is a
twentieth century development. Although some limited-purpose land use
controls based on districting were instituted earlier, the first
comprehensive zoning ordinance was enacted by New York City in 1916.
The ordinance divided most of the city into zones, with different use and
development restrictions for each type of zone. liS Thereafter, zoning as
a form of control spread rapidly throughout the United States, influenced
by a well-publicized model state zoning enabling act, the Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act, prepared under the auspices of the United States
Chamber of Commerce in 1922 and followed as a model by many states.
The spread of zoning also was aided by the widely publicized United
States Supreme Court Euclid decision in 1926 upholding the
constitutionality of zoning.116
Zoning in its earlier form contemplated a land control program that
could rationally and fairly determine in advance how urban areas should
develop in the future: what changes would be permitted in developed areas
and what kinds of improvements and uses would be permitted in
undeveloped ones. For already developed areas, the usual objective was
to create stability by perpetuating current uses and limiting prospects for
change. Some kind of planning was contemplated for almost all zoning,
but it was rare for written plans to be prepared in advance of enacting
zoning ordinances.111 City councils and other local governing bodies,
115. The 1916 New York City Zoning Resolution has been extensively amended at
various times since it was originally enacted. It was comprehensively revised in 1961,
in part to adapt to urban renewal proposals, and has had many amendments since 1961.
The City's zoning regulations are now a long and complex patchwork. For arguments
that another comprehensive revision is needed, see Norman Marcus, New York City
Zoning-1961-1991: Turning Back the Clock-But with An Up-to-the-Minute Social
Agenda, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 707 (1992).
116. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Indicative of the
significance of the Euclid case is that a conference was held in 1986 to celebrate its
sixtieth anniversary, and papers given at the conference were the nucleus for a superb
book on zoning, ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 112. On the early
history of zoning, see SEYMOUR I. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN (1969).
The earlier concept of zoning as providing relatively fixed use districts with little
anticipated need for change is often referred to as Euclidean zoning, after the form of
zoning involved in, or perceived by the Court as involved in, Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.
117. Early state zoning enabling acts usually provided that zoning should be in
accord with a comprehensiveplan, a requirement of the Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act, but these acts generally were not construed to require a separate wriUen plan, some
courts concluding that the zoning ordinance itself was adequate expression of a
comprehensive plan. On the comprehensive plan requirement, see 1 ANDERSON, supra
note 112, §§ 5.02-5.11.
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drawing on expert consultants as they felt needed, were considered
competent to set standards for the future without resort to pre-enactment
written plans. .
For the most part, zoning early-on was anticipated to be self-executing
in that the ordinance would clearly set forth what could or could not be
done and land owners could proceed accordingly. A local building
inspector or other local government official might have to approve new
construction or major remodeling, but these officials would have no
authorized discretion to depart from the terms of the ordinance. However,
it was recognized that some flexibility in the system might, on occasion,
be needed. The ordinance might have undesirable consequences if applied
to some land parcels, and building inspectors or other local officials might
misinterpret the ordinance to the land owners' disadvantage.
Administrative relief in these situations was therefore made available.
Variances could be granted if application of the ordinance would cause
unnecessary hardship to a land owner; and special use permits, also known
as special exceptions or conditional uses, could be authorized by a local
government agency, in its discretion, for certain designated uses otherwise
prohibited in the applicable zone, such as an airport or trailer camp.
Furthermore, appeal was available from local government rulings that a
land owner considered to be in violation of the ordinance. One or more
local government administrative agencies, such as a board of zoning
appeals, was generally designated to consider requests for these kinds of
relief, with further appeal then possible to the courts.
As zoning has matured, it has changed significantly. Zoning
ordinances have become more detailed, typically with more kinds of
districts and more restrictions on how land may be used and developed in
most districts. Also, professional land planners are more extensively
relied on, with central cities and many larger suburbs having professional
planning staffs that devote much of their time to zoning matters. In
addition, some localities have developed and maintain written
comprehensive plans; and a few states, by statute, require that local
zoning ordinances be consistent with these separately prepared plans.118
A particularly important change in zoning has been the move in many
localities toward more flexibility, often with more discretion in local
zoning administrators and local governing bodies to adapt to changing
needs and demands as they emerge. It has become evident that the
relatively fixed and predetermined form of zoning as initially conceived
is unsuited to the manifold pressures for change, often unpredictable, in
how land, especially urban land, should be developed and used. Pressures
118. On consistencyrequirements, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & A. DAN TARLOCK,
LAND-UsE CONTROLS, CASES AND MATERIALS 403-06 (1981); and MANDELKER, supra
note 112, §§ 3.15-3.17.
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exerted have come both from market forces and political interests and
have had to be accommodated. One response has been rather liberal
granting of variances and special permits when requested, and the volume
of these requests has been substantial, with appeal to the courts common.
Another response has been the adoption in many localities of new forms
of zoning that authorize departures from the conventional model. One of
these new forms is contract zoning, in which a property owner covenants
with local government zoning authorities on how land will be used or
improved if rezoned. 119 Another is floating zones, in which a zoned
district is provided for, but is not located on the zoning map until later,
often after negotiation with one or more developers. 120
With the advent of large multiple lot developments, most of them
large subdivisions of single-family dwellings built by the same developers,
came the planned unit development as a land control variant of
zoning. 121 Rather than requiring each structure and each lot to comply
with the same zoning requirements, under the planned unit development
form of control, the entire subdivision is considered a functional unit.
The developer has options to cluster and mix uses and to design structures
to enhance utility and increase market appeal. But the developer's plan
must be approved in advance by local government authorities. Planned
unit developments are now common in much of the United States. A less
frequently used form of land control is performance zoning, which is
attractive to some developers because of the greater design and use
discretion it gives them, particularly suitable to industrial properties. l22
Replacing many of the more usual use and structure standards,
performance zoning requires adherence to measurable limits on such
conditions as noise, environmental pollution, water runoff, and traffic
generated from each lot or site area, and may limit permissible buildable
areas to protect existing natural resources such as wetlands and
woodlands. Developing acceptable performance standards and recruiting
staff sufficiently skilled to monitor compliance effectively has proven
difficult.
Zoning is a powerful means for controlling land use and development,
and one that has varied considerably over time and from locality to
locality. But its perceived objectives are likely to differ with different
119. On contract zoning, see MANDELKER, supra note 112, §§ 6.60-6.62; and Note,
Contract and Conditional Zoning, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 825 (1972).
120. On floating zones, see MANDELKER, supra note 112, § 6.59.
121. On planned unit developments, see MANDELKER, id. §§ 9.20-9.26; and
Symposium, Planned Unit Development, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 3 (1965).
122. On performance zoning, see DOUGI.AS R. PORTER ET AL, FLEXmLB ZONING:
How IT WORKS (1988); and Martin Jaffe, PerjonnanceZoning: A Reassessment, 3 LAND
USB L. & ZONING DIG., n. 3, at 3 (1993).
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interest groups and with the type of zoning program in effect. Also, the
perception of what zoning seeks to accomplish may vary with the kind of
community involved: for example, developed or undeveloped; central city
or suburb; downtown or outlying commercial; or high-income, moderate-
income, or low-income residential. However, there are certain broad
objectives that are evident in most zoning programs:
-Local government in each locality should be the principal
government decision maker as to land within that locality, including what
zoning regulations should be imposed and how they should be
administered.
-Zoning, through the districting device, should prevent inconsistent
land uses, including adverse spillover effects or externalities, within and
among districts in each local jurisdiction. The implication here is that the
market unrestrained can have undesirable consequences within a locality,
including a reduction in land values from undesirable spillovers.
-Zoning should exert major influence over the character and
ambiance of life in each zoned district. This can mean influencing not
only what goes on in the district-what sorts of work, recreation, or
residential lifestyle behavior, for instance-but also what kinds of people
regularly are present there. Whether publicly admitted or not, a major
appeal of zoning in many residential communities is that it helps preserve
the community for residents of the same economic and social class and
with much the same life styles; it frequently is used to deter most
minorities, the poor, and often those of moderate income from moving
into more affluent districts.
There are other zoning objectives; those which are more common
merit mention here. One of these is an increase in the local property tax
base by zoning favorable to major new developments that will add
substantially to the tax rolls. For example, rezoning to permit a major
new shopping center or office building complex, or increasing the
permitted height or bulk of buildings in downtown areas. Decreasing
local government expenditures is another rather common zoning goal; for
example, large lot single-family zoning requirements may reduce the need
for expensive new local public schools, or a refusal to zone a riverfront
area for any development may relieve local government from having to
construct an expensive retaining wall or levee. Increasingly, too, zoning
is being used to achieve greater environmental protection. Il1ustrative of
this are height and setback requirements for high-rise buildings to provide
more sunlight and better air circulation, bulk restrictions on buildings in
high-density areas to limit traffic volume and accompanying pollution,
limiting most heavy industry to a separate zone, and the creation of open-
space zones to protect wetlands, woodlands, and agriculture. Some zoning
ordinances have provisions expressly designed to further the objective of
more housing for low- and moderate-income people. Inclusionary zoning
provisions have this aim and usually provide for a mandatory set-aside of
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a certain number of housing units for low- and moderate-income tenants
or buyers as a condition for approval of a new housing project. They may
also provide incentives such as density bonuses or accelerated zoning
approval procedures for those developers who voluntarily agree to such
set-asides.123
Still another zoning objective, one that is apparent in many zoning
ordinances, is the improvement or protection of the aesthetic appearance
of buildings, urban landscapes, or other physical areas. Zoned sign
controls and architectural style conformity requirements for all houses in
some residential neighborhoods are examples of efforts to further the
aesthetic objective. There also are aesthetic objectives implicit in many
downtown building height, bulk, and setback requirements, especially
along major boulevards or waterfronts with impressive skyline potential.
However, the subjective nature of beauty has made the aesthetic objective
an especially difficult one to implement or justify.124
As is evident from this brief review, zoning can be structured in many
ways to achieve a variety of objectives. It is a form of land control
subject to extensive shaping and adjusting to accommodate local pressures
and needs. However, as with all major forms of government land control,
zoning has created considerable controversy and has been heavily
criticized. The extent to which zoning should be used to preserve
community character or ambiance by keeping out some kinds of people,
often including residents who are poor, less-affluent, or are racial or
ethnic minorities (so-called exculsionary zoning), has been very
controversial.125 But what can be done about exclusionary zoning?
There is no doubt that exclusionary zoning is common and popular in
many suburbs and many sections of central cities. It is made possible by
123. There is a considerableliterature on inclusionary zoning, although adoption of
this device has been fairly limited. On inclusionary zoning, see for example, DWIOHT
MERRIAM ET AL., INCLUSIONARY ZONINO MOVES DOWNTOWN (1985); Lawrence
Berger, Inclusionary Zoning Devices as Takings: TheLegacy ofthe Mount Laurel Cases,
70 NEB. L. REv. 183 (1991); and Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of "Inclusionary"
Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1167 (1981).
124. On aesthetic zoning, see JoHN' J. COSTONIS, ICONS AND ALIENs: LAW,
AEsnnmcs, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANOE (1989); and MANDBLKBR, supra note 112,
§§ 11.01-11.21.
125. On exclusionary zoning, see 1 ANDERSON, supra note 112, ch. 8; RICHARD F.
BABCOCK & FRED P. BOSSBLMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONINO: LAND USE REOULATION
AND HOUSINO IN THE 1970s (1973); MANDBLKBR, supra note 112, ch. 7; 1 WILLIAMS,
AMERICAN LAND PLANNINo LAw, supra note 112, chs. 59-66; 1 MANAOEMENT &
CONTROL OF GROWfH, chs. 6 & 7 (Randall W. Scott et al. OOs., 1975); REPORT OF THE
NAT. COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBS., supra note 1, at 211-17; and Orlando E. Delogu,
The Misuse ofLand Control Power Must End: Suggestionsfor Legislative and Judicial
Responses, 32 ME. L. REv. 29 (1980).
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such zoning requirements as single family detached dwelling unit districts,
large residential lots, large front-footage for residential lots, large
minimum floor space per dwelling unit, prohibitions on mobile homes,
and variance grants for new high-income resident apartment buildings in
central city transition areas. High occupancy cost is used to exclude those
targeted as undesirables.
Exclusionary zoning has been severely criticized by many politicians,
citizen action groups, and scholars, but it persists because it is strongly
favored by many localities and in many neighborhoods. Legal efforts
have been made to eliminate it using such means as inclusionary
zoning;l26 state legislative intervention, notably New Jersey's Fair
Housing Act127 and the Massachusetts Anti-Snob Zoning Act;l28 and
resort to the courts, with a scattering of opinions negating or curbing some
aspects of exclusionary zoning,l29 the best-mown of these being the
Mount Laurel cases in New Jersey.l30 The net effect of these efforts has
at best been modest. 131 Residential segregation, grounded heavily on
income and class, is a major feature of American society; and support for
exclusion in most places has been too strong to overcome.
Exclusionary zoning is particularly troublesome when its adverse
consequences extend to neighboring communities. The relative autonomy
of each municipality over zoning matters usually makes it impossible for
an adversely affected municipality to prevent negative spillover caused by
the zoning actions of neighboring municipalities. Among those that
126. See supra note 123.
127. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-27D301 to 52-27D329, as amended (West 1986 &
Supp. 1994). See also supra note 114.
128. 1969 Massachusetts Low- and Moderate-Income Housing Act (codified at
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (West 1979 & Supp. 1994». See also supra
note 114.
129. Recent exclusionary zoning caselaw is considered in 3 WILLIAMS, AMERICAN
LAND P1..ANNINo LAW, supra note 112, at ch. 66. Also see Richard Briffault, Our
Localism: Part I - The Structure ofLocal GovernmentLaw, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 39-58
(1990); and Thomas W. Mayo, Exclusionary Zoning, Remedies, and the Expansive Role
of the Court in Public Law Litigation, 31 SYRACUSE L. REv. 755 (1980), noting a
reticence of courts to become involved in exclusionary zoning matters. ld. at 757.
130. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel (Mt. Laurel
1),336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975), appeal dismissedfor want ofjurisdiction & cert. denied,
423 U.S. 808 (1975); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel
(Mt. Laurel m, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
131. There are even mixed views as to the accomplishments of New Jersey's fair
housing efforts. Cf. Rachel Fox, The Selling Out ofMount Laurel: Regional Contribution
Agreements in New Jersey's Fair Housing Act, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 535 (1988); and
Martha Lamar et al., Mount Laurel at Work: Affordable Housing in New Jersey, 1983-
1988, 41 RUTOERS L. REv. 1197 (1989).
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normally have little recourse are central cities and their residents,
adversely impacted from exclusionary zoning by the suburbs. But should
control over possible intra-regional exclusionary zoning spillover be a
responsibility assumed by some more centralized government-a regional
government, the state, or the federal government? This raises the more
fundamental and highly controversial issue of the extent to which effective
local government control over land should be cut back and more
responsibility assumed by governments with jurisdictions that extend
throughout a metropolitan region or beyond. There has been some
movement toward more responsibility over regional land use problems
being assumed by governments with regional or wider jurisdictions; but,
except in a few places, this has had little effect in curbing exclusionary
zoning.132
Another controversial feature of zoning concerns procedure. There
are those who believe that, although zoning flexibility is needed,
procedures for obtaining variances and other forms of government
approval are unduly slow and expensive, and are especially burdensome
on developers, to whom timing can be crucial. There also are assertions
that local administrative hearing procedures on zoning matters frequently
are conducted so informally as to lack elementary due process; procedural
rules often are inconsistently applied and give too much discretion to
government decision makers. In addition, local government officials who
participate in the approval process commonly lack the necessary training
or expertise to perform adequately. 133 Among solutions proposed are
more explicit and detailed statutory directives, including expanded and
revised enabling acts, and statewide administrative agencies that would
review local administrative agency rulings. 134
One argument made in support of the piecemeal and arguably
inefficient and economically irrational nature of zoning procedures is that
they are a useful participatory means of resolving local conflicts among
132. Among state governments that have had some success in limiting exclusionary
zoning are New Jersey and Massachusetts. On the experience of these states, see supra
note 114. Local-state growth management programs also are promising means for more
effective control of exclusionary zoning.
133. On zoning's procedural deficiencies, see, for example, BABCOCK, supra note
112, 153-56; 5 Wtlliams, American Land Planning Law, supra note 112, §§ 163.80-
163.81; Ronald M. Shapiro, The Zoning Variance Power-Constructive in Theory,
Destructive in Practice, 29 MD. L. REv. 3 (1969); and for an attack on the initiative and
referendum as a means of rezoning, see David L. Callies et aI., Ballot Box Zoning:
Initiative, Referendum and the Law, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 53 (1991).
134. See, e.g., BABCOCK, supra note 112, 156-57; George W. Liebmann, The
Modernization ofZoning: Enabling Act Revision as a Means to Refonn, 23 URB. LAW.
1, 1-24 (1991).
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land owners, developers, and neighbors, especially in stable residential
communities.135 These procedures not only protect existing viable
residential communities from overly rapid change, it is asserted, but help
to foster and preserve local community values and a much-to-be-desired
sense of belonging. Citizen access is encouraged by the zoning process,
and zoning board officials are sensitive to local opinion, even though their
decisions often may seem arbitrary and inconsistent when measured by
legal standards.
Another troublesome zoning issue on which there are conflicting views
is the proper role of planning and plans in zoning programs. Should there
be a plan requirement, should the plan be included in a separate document
from the zoning ordinances, who should prepare and approve the plan,
how detailed and comprehensive should it be, and should there be a legal
requirement that the zoning ordinance be consistent with the plan?
Further problems relate to growth management programs that impose
comprehensive planning regionally or state-wide, and which, in plan
implementation, absorb zoning as but one control element in a broad-based
governmental approach to urban growth. Should such growth
management programs be adopted in more states and more fully
implemented in states where adopted? On all these questions there are
sharp differences of opinion.
The strongly pro-planning position is that, in the interests of fairness
and rationality, local government should develop carefully prepared and
considered comprehensive plans as to how land should be used and
developed over time, and that zoning and other relevant controls should
be consistent with these plans.l36 Critics of the pro-planning position
argue that there are too ,many uncertainties about the future to justify a
requirement that zoning or other legal controls adhere to detailed planning
135. For an elaboration of this pro-participation zoning argument, see Steele, supra
note 112. On the merits of piecemeal zoning change also see Carol M. Rose, Planning
and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem ofLocal Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L.
REv. 837 (1983). A piecemeal-ease by case-approach to much government land
development is essential and even inevitable according to one informed observer. See Jan
Z. Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning, 31 SYRACUSB L. REv. 719 (1980).
136. On the pro-planning position, as it pertains to zoning, see, for example,
Charles M. Haar, In Accordance Wah A Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REv. 1154
(1955); and Daniel R. Mandelker, The Role of the Comprehensive Plan in Land Use
Regulation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 899 (1976). For an analysis of consistency doctrine
reform issues, see JOSEPH DIMBNTO, TIm CONSISTENCY DOCTRINE AND THE Ln.rrrs OF
PLANNING (1980).
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blueprints.131 These uncertainties are greatest for undeveloped land or
developed land in transition areas, but also apply to stable developed
areas, as over time these areas too are likely to be under change pressures
difficult to predict. Furthermore, the market, according to some, is a
better and more desirable predictor of land use needs than are planners,
and mandated government plans demanding compliance seriously interfere
with the market. Some critics also believe that zoning works best when
zoning changes occur piecemeal or on a case by case basis, and that
requiring conformity with a comprehensive plan seriously handicaps this
optimal process. Moreover, a comprehensive plan is likely to be
ambiguous and difficult to apply if the plan must be approved by a
politically responsible body, such as a city council. So many conflicting
interests must be weighed by this kind of body that, if approved, the plan
will include evasive compromise language that is more confusion than
guide. If the plan is prepared by unelected professional planners and
needs no further approval, this poses problems, too, as it would be subject
to criticism as undemocratic, for technocrats should not be given such
power. To be sure, professional planning expertise is needed, but, it is
claimed, should be kept within bounds politically. Still another aspect of
the comprehensive planning problem is that some small localities with
planning and zoning obligations employ no professional planners, often
because they cannot afford them, so needed expertise may be unavailable
for comprehensive planning. One approach followed in some localities
that may ease somewhat critics' complaints about comprehensive plans is
to regularly revise comprehensive plans as new needs and demands
emerge.138 Also, as the next section indicates, some growth
management programs have resolved successfully a number of land
planning's problems, but they have done so by giving more power to
government than many opponents of planning consider acceptable.
Most zoning critics merely recommend systemic reform. But there
137. On arguments against aspects of planning that bear on zoning, see
Krasnowiecki, supra note 135, at 744-49; ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONINO AND PROPERTY
RIOlITS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LAND-USE REOULATION, ch. 3
(1977); Rose, supra note 135, at 873-82; Lawrence Susskind, Should State Government
Mandate Local Planning? ...No, PLAN. July 1978, at 17 (responding to a contrary
position by Daniel Mandelker, Should State Government Mandate Local Planning?
... Yes, PLAN. July 1978, at 14); and A. Dan Tarlock, Consistency With Adopted Land
Use Plans as a Standard ofReview: The Case Against, 9 URB. L. ANN. 69 (1975).
138. The ALI Model Land Development Code, section 3-105, requires that the local
plan include a short-tenn program every one to five years that sets forth what public
actions are to be undertaken to fulfill the plan's goals. Krasnowiecki proposes instead
local government annual stock-taking reports that set long- and short-range projections
and explain or criticize failure to achieve projections declared in the preceding annual
report. Krasnowiecki, supra note 135, at 747-48.
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are those who believe that zoning has such basic faults that all zoning
should be eliminated and other forms of control relied on instead.
Arguments in support of this position have created considerable interest
but so far have imposed no serious threat to zoning programs. Most of
those who favor the abolition ofzoning are wary ofgovernment regulation
and believe that market forces should be given more influence over how
land is used and developed than is possible with zoning. Zoning, it is
asserted, is inefficient and inequitable. It gives land value windfalls to
many property owners and often increases unnecessarily the cost of
housing and other kinds of land use to purchasers and tenants. Some
zoning opponents have proposed what they consider less costly but fairer
controls as substitutes for zoning. One such proposal is for more
extensive reliance on restrictive covenants imposed on land by private land
owners. This, it is argued, would more efficiently and equitably protect
property from adverse inconsistent uses than, does zoning, as restrictive
covenants better reflect market forces and the will of local property
owners. l39 Other proposals also would replace zoning with controls less
restrictive of market forces and hopefully less likely to create negative
spillovers. Among such proposals are detailed suggestions for an
expanded nuisance prevention system;l40 legislatively-imposed density
restrictions on developing undeveloped land, with little additional
139. On the restrictive covenant rather than zoning approach, see Robert C.
Ellickson, Allernatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use
Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681 (1973); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, LAND USB WITHOUT
ZoNING (1972); and Bernard H. Siegan, Conserving and Developing the Land, 27 SAN
DIEOO L. REv. 279,295-307 (1990). This approach was for many years adhered to by
Houston, the only big city in the United States without zoning, and Siegan argues that
the Houston experience should be widely followed. Siegan's position is weakened
somewhat by Houston's enactment of a zoning ordinance in 1991. That enactment,
however, was subject to a referendum in 1993 and it was defeated, as zoning had been
in two prior referenda. On the 1993 Houston referendum and future land control
alternatives, see Donna H. Kristaponis, Zoning Houston, Why It Matters, and the
Aftermath of the Referendum, 1994 PROCEEDINGS OF lNST. ON PLAN., ZONING &
EMINENT DOMAIN 2-1 (1994) For a composite of Siegan's speeches given prior to the
1993 referendum and urging Houston voters to reject zoning, see Bernard H. Siegan,
Non-Zoning is the Best Zoning, 31 CAL. W.L. REv. 127 (1994).
For another approach to the problem, but also concluding that zoning should be
eliminated, see Krasnowiecki, supra note 135. Krasnowiecki argues that self-
administering rules laid down by the legislative body of a municipality long in advance
of development, the fundamental idea of zoning, is inconsistent with how zoning works
or should work. Id. at 719~20. He proposes that zoning be replaced by an adjudicative
model of land control that, at least for new housing development, would provide for local
government case by case approval, but also would require persuasive reasons to rebut a
general presumption that projects be approved. Id. at 749-50.
140. See Ellickson, supra note 139.
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government limitation on such development;141 and the allocation of
extensive land control rights to private neighborhood organizations
resembling condominium associations. 142
Zoning is so well established and widely prevalent in the United States
that it probably will remain the principal local government land use
control program for the indefinite future in many states. In the other
states, states with regional or state-wide growth management programs,
it will continue as a highly important element in these more expansive and
comprehensive land use control efforts. Zoning's effectiveness in
furthering powerful interest group preferences, its adaptability to diverse
conditions, and, as a regulatory device, its modest cost to government,
will help perpetuate it as a major means by which government controls
land use and development.
IV. GROWTH MANAGEMENT
Growth management is a land use control program that seeks to
regulate the rate, location and character of urban growth and
development.143 It characteristically relies heavily on long-term
141. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Deregulating Land Use: An AlJernative Free
Enterprise Development System, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 28 (1981). Under the Kmiec
proposal, density would be based principally on the ratio of floor space of structures on
a parcel to total area of the parcel left open, and density maximums would vary with the
types of use the land is put to: residential, commercial, industrial, or mixed-use.
Common law nuisance restrictions would still apply and restrictive covenants would be
permitted.
142. ROBERT H. NELSON, supra note 137.
For market-oriented zoning replacement proposals, see GARRETT, supra note 112,
ch. 4; and Robert H. Nelson, Zoning Myth and Practice-From Euclid into the Future,
in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 112, ch.11. Compare Wn.LIAM A.
FIsCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERlY RIGIITS APPROACH TO
AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 69-71 (1985) (proposing that zoning rights be salable
if zoning is retained).
143. Among recent helpful publications on growth management are these: CARL
ABBOTT ET AL., PLANNING THE OREGON WAY, A TwENTY-YEAR EVALUATION (1994);
UNDERSTANDING GROWTH MANAGEMENT: CRITICAL ISSUES AND A REsEARCH AGENDA
(David J. Brower et a1. eds., 1989); STATE AND REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING:
IMPLEMENTING NEW METHODS FOR GROWTH MANAGEMENT (peter A. Buchsbaum and
Larry J. Smith eds., 1993); JOHN M. DEGRovE, THE NEW FRONTIER FOR LAND
POLICY: PLANNING & GROWTH MANAGEMENT IN THE STATES (1992); ANTHONY
DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITIAN AMERICA (1994); ERIC D. KELLY,
MANAGING COMMUNITY GROWTH: POLICIES, TECHNIQUES, AND IMPACTS (1993);
GERRIT KNAAP & ARTHUR C. NELSON, THE REGULATED LANDSCAPE: LESSONS ON
STATE LAND USE PLANNING FROM OREGON (1992); STATE AND REGIONAL INITIATIVES
FOR MANAGING DEVELOPMENT: POLICY ISSUES AND PRACTICAL CONCERNS (Douglas
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comprehensive planning, increasingly involves substantial guidance by
state government, and frequently seeks to deal with a variety of public
concerns as to the economic, life style, and environmental costs of urban
expansion regionally or state-wide. In many respects it resembles zoning,
but it typically relies more on comprehensive planning and resorts to a
more varied set of legal controls. Zoning is even being co-opted in many
places as one of the control devices of growth management. Also, growth
management programs usually focus on urban-rural fringe areas, rather
than on older and more densely settled central cities and inner suburbs.
Zoning, of course, generally has been of particular importance in older,
built-up urban areas, although it is often applicable in the outer reaches of
metropolitan areas as well.144
Instances are readily apparent of legal controls, zoning included, long
being used to block or limit severely growth in communities fearful of
being overwhelmed by rapid population increase or extensive new
development. The modern growth management program, however,
usually takes a different approach. It generally seeks to accommodate
rather than deny growth, and attempts to do so by rational planning,
backed by meaningful legal controls that aim to balance fairly the benefits
and burdens that accompany growth. Moreover, the trend is for each
managed growth program to apply not just to a single city or town subject
R. Porter ed., 1992); GRO\vrH MANAGEMENT: KEEPING ON TARGET? (Douglas R.
Porter ed., 1986); GROWTH MANAGEMENT: THE P1..ANNINo CHALLENOE OF THE 1990's
(Jay M. Stein ed., 1993); James M. Wickersham, The Quiet Revolution Continues: The
Emerging New Modelfor State Growth Management Statutes, 18 HARv. ENV'L L. REv.
489 (1994); Symposium, Growth Management and the Environment in the 199Os, 24
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 905 (1991); Anthony Downs, Growth Management: Satan or
Savior?, 58 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 419 (1992); and Guidancefor Growth: Ii Symposium
on Washington State's Growth Management Act, 16 U. PuOET SOUND L. REv. 863
(1993). Earlier works of major importance in formulating and publicizing the growth
management movement are MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF GROWTH (Randall W. Scott
et al. eds., 1975) (published by the Urban Land Institute, with funding from the U.S.
Department ofHousing and Urban Development); and THE USE OF LAND: A CITIZENS'
POllCY GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH (\Villiam K. Reilly ed., 1973), a task force report
sponsored by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Also see a near book-length article on
growth controls that has had considerable influence on planners, economists, and legal
scholars, Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977).
144. In comparing growth management and zoning, some observers have stressed
that growth management is active and dynamic, While zoning is reactive, passive and
static. E.g., Benjamin Chinitz, Growth Management: Goodfor the Town, Badfor the
Nation?, 56 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 3, 6 (1990). There is some merit in this as growth
management commonly seeks to establish future development patterns for largely
undeveloped areas, whereas zoning often seeks to freeze existing development patterns
for already developed communities.
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to heavy growth pressures, but to much larger regions, thus reducing the
risks of negative spillover from legal controls imposed in just one
10cality.l45 To help facilitate fair and achievable growth management
programs over wide areas, the trend also is toward extensive state
government intervention in program planning and implementation.146
There are many concerns that arise as to how prospective urban
growth may affect a community. Among these are the added
infrastructure needed to accomodate anticipated growth, and when it is
likely to be in place; threats to the environment from further growth; and
effects of growth on local life styles and the character of local
neighborhoods. Financial costs also are often concerns. For example,
what are the likely impacts of growth on costs of housing, commutation,
and utilities; and what will gro~ do to property tax assessments and
rates? Perceptions of urban growth may vary depending on the vantage
point of the observer. Certainly, the merits of growth can differ
considerably when looked at by government officials of a single town or
city accustomed to acting autonomously on land issues pertaining to their
community, or by regional or state government officials contemplating
region-wide or state-wide action.
Growth control objectives are responses to a variety of concerns; as
prospects of urban growth usually raise multiple concerns, it is not
surprising that growth control programs usually have multiple objectives.
Multiple objectives also broaden program support, although they can
create problems as to which objectives should receive priority and as to
how possible inconsistencies among objectives should be handled. As
145. Some commentators refer to earlier no growth or slow growth attempts as fIrst
generation growth control measures, typified by small population bedroom suburbs'
restrictions on new residential construction. These ftrst generation measures have been
followed by more comprehensive and sophisticated second generation controls covering
much larger areas. See, e.g., Peter Navarro & Richard Carson, Growth Controls:
Policy Analysis for the Second Generation, 24 POL'y SCI. 127 (1991). Also see
LAWRENCE B. BURROWS, GROWTH MANAGEMENT: ISSUES, TECHNIQUES AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS (1978).
146. The increased involvement of the states in land development was signaled
early-on by an influential book published in 1971, FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID L.
CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL, updated by Professor Callies
in The Quiet Revolution Revisited: A Quarter Century ofProgress, 26 URB. LAW. 197
(1994). Also, in 1975, the influential American Law Institute proposed a model code
under which more land development policy making responsibility would be assumed by
state govemment, with administration taken over largely by local agencies. A.L.I., A
MODEL LAND DEV. CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1975). For commentary on the code,
see Fred P. Bosselman et aI., Some Observations on the American Law Institute's Model
Land Development Code, in THE LAND USE AWAKBNlNO, ZONINO LAW IN THE
SEVENTIES (Robert H. Freilich & Eric O. Stuhler eds., 1981).
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disclosed by legislative declarations of purpose, program plans and
program performance, common objectives of current growth management
programs are these:
-Preventurban sprawl by encouraging more dense and more compact
development, and avoiding leap-frog development projects in urban rural
fringe areas;
-Through proper siting, design, and installation timing, limit the cost
of new and expanded infrastructure, such as roads, mass transit facilities,
sewers, utilities, and schools;
-Preserve and protect the environment and needed open space areas,
including farm and forest lands, flood plains, wetlands, river front and
coastal terrain, adequate water supplies, and air and water quality;
-Preserve the quality of life of existing urban communities, which
to many means protecting the character of existing communities from
newcomers of a different race, ethnic background, or social class;
-Adopt policies that will restrain increases in housing costs and that
will assure a substantial volume of housing in newly developed areas that
persons of moderate income can afford;
-Prevent growth and development in anyone city or town that will
unjustifiably have a negative impact on neighboring cities or towns;
-Encourage economic development and added employment
opportunities, especially in depressed localities and regions. 147
Growth management programs do not exist nationally but at present
are limited principally to those states, regions, and localities faced with
rapid growth and development pressures. Growth management is highly
political,148 usually requiring careful consensus building among key
potential support groups, especially at the initial formulation and early
147. On managed growth objectives, see BURROWS, supra note 145, at 11-12;
DEGROVE, supra note 143, at 2-3 and ch. 10; DAVID R. GODSCHALK ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF GROWTH MANAGEMENT 8-9, 191-92 (1977); Douglas R.
Porter, Issues in Stale and Regional Growth Management, in STATE AND REGIONAL
INITIATIVES FOR MANAGING DEVELOPMENT, supra note 143, ch. 7; Douglas R. Porter,
State Growth Management: The Intergovernmental Experiment, 13 PACE L. REv. 481,
at 484-85 (1993); and Henry R. Richmond, From Sea to Shining Sea: Manifest Destiny
and the National Land Use Dilemma, 13 PACE L. REv. 327, 337-47 (1993).
Economic development is a more recent addition to the objectives of growth .
management and one authority on the subject has concluded that inclusion of economic
development components has been an important factor in enabling some growth
management systems politically to survive during the severe recession ofthe early 1990s.
DEGROVE, supra note 143, at 166.
148. On the political aspects ofgrowth management, see JOHN M. DEGRoVE, LAND
GROWTH & POLITICS (1984).
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implementation stages. 149 Some groups are prone to be supportive, the
professional land planners and their trade associations, for example, and
most citizen action groups concerned with the environment. Also, growth
management is often seen as highly desirable by residents of communities
undergoing sharp population expansion and threatened with increasingly
serious traffic problems, sharp tax increases, overcrowded schools,
enhanced personal security risks, water shortages, and decline in the
quality of such public amenities as nearby parks, playgrounds, beaches,
and camping areas. It is no surprise that growth management has been
especially popular in places like Southern California, the San Francisco
Bay Area, metropolitan Portland (Oregon), and much of Florida.
Interjection of economic development into growth management agendas
has also generated support from some business and labor groups
concerned about jobs and new business opportunities.
There also are groups inclined to oppose growth management,
although a carefully crafted program may attract their support, or at least
weaken their resistance. Opposition is likely from many developers, most
speculators in vacant lands near the urban-rural fringe, and farmers just
beyond urbanized areas who may have been waiting years for anticipated
big profits from selling out to developers. Civil rights groups will
probably be negative if growth management efforts will appreciably
increase race, ethnic or class exclusion, and especially if those supporting
these efforts obviously are seeking to expand the exclusions. Grassroots
property rights groups also have emerged to resist growth management on
the grounds that it improperly, and even illegally, encroaches on the
property rights of land owners.
Support for growth control has been sufficiently strong for a scattering
of local governments, mostly suburban towns, many of them in
149. On pro- and anti-growth management groups, see GODSCHALK BT AL., supra
note 147, at 13-15; KNAAP & NELSON, supra note 143, ch. 7; Dowell Myers, The
Ecology of "Quality of Life n and Urban Growth, in UNDERSTANDING GROWTH
MANAGEMENT, supra note 143, at 87-104; and Sylvia Lewis, Goodbye, Ramapo. Hello,
Yakima and Isle ofPalms, 58 PLAN., July, 1992, at 9.
In Oregon, an influential citizens' action group, 1,000 Friends of Oregon, is heavily
involved in advancing growth management objectives, including through political
pressure and litigation. On the Oregon organization, see DBGROVE, supra note 148, at
278-79; and Gerrit Knaup, Land Use Politics in Oregon, in ABBOTT BT AL., supra note
143, at 9-10. Similar 1,000 Friends organizations supportive of growth management
have been established in Florida and Massachusetts; and a comparable organization, New
Jersey Future, operates in New Jersey.
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California,lSO to have put into effect impressive growth management
programs without significant, ifany, state government involvement. Some
of these programs, such as the one in Ramapo, New York, and the one in
Petaluma, California, have been extensively publicized as a result ofmajor
litigation upholding their validity. ISl Among other local growth
management programs of note are those adopted in Boulder, Colorado;
lincoln, Nebraska; San Diego, California; and Montgomery County,
Maryland. ls2 However, the most important development in growth
management programs has been the extensive involvement of a number of
state governments in these programs, the state imposing requirements on
localities as to program planning and operatio~. Programs are largely
administered by localities but pursuant to state directives and oversight.
Nine states are now substantially involved with their localities in growth
management: Oregon and Washington in the Pacific Northwest; Florida
and Georgia in the Southeast; and Maryland, New Jersey, Rhode Island,
150. On local government growth management programs in California, see
MADELYN GLICKFELD & NED LEVINE, REGIONAL GROWfH .•• LOCAL REAcnON: THE
ENACTMENT AND EFFECTS OF LOCAL GROwtH CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT
MEASURES IN CALIFORNIA (1992). This study indicates that as of 1989, approximately
three-fourths of all cities and counties in California had enacted at least one growth
control measure. Id. at 21. On growth management in California, also see IRVING
SCHIFFMAN, ALTERNATIVE TECHNIQUES FOR MANAGING GRO\VfH (1990), and Richard
T. LeGates, The Emergence of Flexible Growth Management Systems in the San
Francisco Bay Area, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1035 (1991).
151. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y 1972),
appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972); Construction Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County
v. Petaluma, 522F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). See also
Associated Home Builders, Greater Eastbay Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473
(Cal. 1976); Board of County Comm. of Arapahoe County V. Denver Bd. of Water
Comm'rs, 718 P.2d 235 (Colo. 1986). But see City of Boca Raton V. Boca Villas Corp.,
371 So.2d 154 (Fla. App. 1979), cert. denied, 381 So.2d 765 (Fla.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 824 (1980); Rancourt V. Town of Barnstead, 523 A.2d 55 (N.H. 1986). On legal
challenges to local growth control measures, see Julie H. Biggs, No Drip, No Flush, No
Growth: How Cities Can Control Growth Beyond Their Boundaries by Refusing to
Extend Utility Services, 22 URB. LAW. 285 (1990); and Katherine E. Stone & Philip A.
Seymour, Regulating the Tuning ofDevelopment: Takings Clause and Substantive Due
Process Challenges to Growth Control Regulations, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1205 (1991).
152. See generally on these and similar programs, GRO\VfH MANAGEMENT:
KEEPING ON TARGET?, supra note 143. On the Lincoln and San Diego programs, see
Douglas R. Porter, Do State Growth Management Acts Make a Difference? Local
Growth Management Measures Under Different State Growth Policies, 24 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 1015 (1991). The Boulder and Montgomery County programs are discussed in
KELLY, supra note 143, at 53-61,95-99, 198-205.
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Vermont and Maine among the Middle Atlantic and New England
states.1S3 Important state legislation in the 1970s and thereafter, starting
with a Vermont statute in 1970,154 a Florida statute in 1972,155 and an
Oregon statute in 1973,156 have authorized these joint local-state land use
control ventures. The initial legislative enactments have been extensively
amended or supplemented in most of the states, indicating both the
political controversy that growth management creates and the difficulties
in establishing workable and affordable growth management
programs. 157 In Hawaii, there also are stringent state-wide land-use
controls that manage growth, but these controls are imposed and
implemented by the state government with little local government
participation. 158
Planning is an essential feature ofmost growth management programs,
and legislation providing for growth management programs that extend
regionally or state-wide either mandates or strongly encourages
153. The basic growth management statutes in the nine states are the following:
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3161-3239, 186.001-.515, 187.201, 189.401-.427,
190.001-.048 (West Supp. 1995); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-70-1 to 36-70-5
(1993), §§ 50-8-7 to 50-8-8 & 50-8-39.1 (1994 & Supp. 1994); Maine, ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, §§ 13001-13004; and tit. 30A, §§ 4312-4349 (West Supp. 1994); Maryland,
MD. ANN. CODE art. 66b §§ 1.00-12.01 (1988 &Supp.1992); MD. CODE ANN., STATE
FIN. & PRoc. §§ 5-101 to 5-7A..Q2 (1995); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:18A-
196 to 207 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. §§ 195, 197, 199
(1993); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 45-22.2-1 to 14 (1991 & Supp. 1994);
Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6092 (1993) & tit. 24, §§ 4301-4495 (1992);
and Washington, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 36.70.010-36.70.980, 36.70A.045-
36.70A.902 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994).
154. Public Act. No. 250, 1969 Vt. Adj. Sess.
155. 1972 Fla. Laws ch. 72-317.
156. 1973 Or. Laws ch. 80.
157. The Florida legislative changes have been particularly frequent, consisting of
a sequence of important statutes: the Environmental Land and Water Management Act
of1972, 1972 Fla. Laws ch. 72-317; the Local Government ComprehensivePlanning Act
of 1975, 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-257; the State and Regional Planning Act of 1984, 1984
Fla. Laws, ch. 84-257; the Growth Management Act of 1985, 1985 Fla. Laws ch. 85-55;
and the Growth Management Act of 1993, 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 93-206. On the tortuous
history of growth management legislation in Florida, see DEGRavE, supra note 143, at
7-31.
158. On the Hawaii experience, see DEGRavE, supra note 148, at 9-58; and David
L. Callies, Land-Use Planning in the Fiftieth State, in STATE AND REOIONAL
COMPREHENSIVE P1.ANNINa, supra note 143, at 125-36. The basic Hawaii statute is
HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 225M-l to 225M-4 (Supp. 1992) & §§ 226-1 to 226-107 (1985 &
Supp. 1993). Local government in Hawaii historically has been weak. The state has
four counties but no separate cities, towns or villages.
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comprehensive planning efforts. It is usually expected that most of the
planning will be by local government-towns, cities, counties, or in a few
places metropolitan regional governments. 1S9 However, growth
management programs involving extensive local and state government
participation generally require that the plans be consistent with state goals
and policies. A properly prepared plan requires extensive research on
population and development trends, popular objectives and preferences,
social and economic costs of possible alternative approaches, and legal
limits on possible action.1oo It also requires a sense of what is politically
acceptable. Planning becomes even more demanding and difficult if the
planners are expected to take into consideration the interests of
neighboring communities and the entire metropolitan region. And in some
states, Florida in particular, planning is further complicated by a
concurrency requirement that adequate public infrastructure and services
be in place when development occurs so as to avoid the situation of new
communities being seriously deficient in such community essentials as
sewers, water supply, roads, and parks.161 Many cities and towns have
a long history of some planning as a guide to their land control efforts,
zoning especially. But growth management planning generally must be
more comprehensive and politically is more contentious than what most
local government planning officials previously have encountered. For
smaller localities that cannot afford to hire the expertise necessary to
prepare a proper plan, some state governments have provided funding
help.162 .
To assure that local government plans meet state standards and further
not just local interests but regional or even state-wide interests as well,
states with joint local-state growth management programs provide for state
159. Important metropolitan regional governments with important growth
management planning functions include the Portland, Oregon Metropolitan Service
District and the Atlanta, Georgia Regional Commission. On the relevance of these
bodies for growth management, see DEGRaVE, supra note 143, at 138-55.
160. For some suggestions as to how growth management plans should be
developed, see GODSCHALK ET AL., supra note 147, ch. 15.
161. This so-called concurrencyrequirement is imposed by statute in Florida. FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3164(23), 163.3177(10h), 163.3180 (West Supp. 1993). On
concurrency, see DEGRaVE, supra note 143, at 163-64; Thomas G. Pelham, Adequate
Public Facilities Requirements: Reflections on Florida's Concurrency System for
Managing Growth, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 973 (1992); David L. Powell, Managing
Florida's Growth: The Next Generation, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 223, 291-311 (1993);
and Thomas M. Walsh and Roger A. Pearce, The Concurrency Requirement of the
Washington State Growth Management Act, 16 U. PuGET SOUND L. REv. 1025 (1993).
162. These states include Florida, Oregon, Maine, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Washington. See Dennis E. Gale, Eight State-Sponsored Growth Management Programs:
A Comparative Analysis, 58 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 425,432-33 (1992).
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government monitoring of local planning efforts. 163 Under these
programs, state statutes generally provide for state agency review of local
government plans to determine if the local plans meet state growth
management objectives, are consistent with any state growth management
plans, and are adequately coordinated with the plans of nearby
10calities.l64 In some states, state approval of local government plans is
required,l65 which may entail, as in New Jersey, detailed procedures for
state-local government negotiation of growth management agreements. 166
Local governments that fail to comply with state growth management
planning requirements may be vulnerable to sanctions, such as loss of
eligibility for certain state grants. 167 In Rhode Island, failure of a local
government to prepare a comprehensive plan can result in the state doing
so.168 Local-state conflict over compliance with state imposed
requirements has frequently arisen, and appellate or mediation hearing
bodies and procedures have been established or authorized in some states
to deal with these conflict situations. l69 Clearly, there is recognition not
163. On intergovernmentalstate-local growth managementplanning, see DEGROVE,
supra note 143 at 137 (stating that four of seven states which have new or revamped
growth management systems, have capitalized on existing bureaucratic structures to
enhance the link between state and local governments and to provide greater-than-Iocal
perspectives on issues that are regional in nature); Scott A. Bollens, State Growth
Management: Intergovernmental Frameworks and Policy Objectives, 58 J. AM. PLAN.
Ass'N 454 (1992); Gale, supra note 162, at 425-38; and Porter, State Growth
Management, supra note 147, at 483-95.
164. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177(9) (West 1990 & Supp. 1994); and OR.
REv. STAT. §§ 197.015(1), 197.250-251, & 197.274 (1993).
165. E.g., OR. REv. STAT. §§ 197.250-251 (1993).
166. On New Jersey negotiated agreements, see DEGROVE, supra note 143, at 46-
48; and Gale, supra note 162, at 433-35. See also Judith Eleanor Innes, Group
Processes and the Social Construction of Growth Management: Florida, Vermont and
New Jersey, 58 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 440, at 447-50 (1992).
167. E.g., WASH. REv. CODEANN. §§36.70A.340, .345 (WestSupp.1994). Also
see the chart on state sanctioning possibilities, in Gale, supra note 162, at 432.
Sanctions have been applied sparingly, states being more interested in negotiating
compliance with localities than taking the politically troublesome step of imposing
sanctions. See Porter, supra note 147, at 494.
168. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45.22.2-13 (1991). In Florida, if a local government has
not prepared or properly prepared a required comprehensive plan, a regional planning
agency for the area must do so. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3167(4) (West 1990 & Supp.
1994).
169. E.g., OR. REv. STAT. §§ 197.805, 197.860 (1993) (special reviewing agency
and procedures); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3184(16)0> (West Supp. 1994) (informal
dispute resolution authorized); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-8-7.1(d) (1990) (mediation). On
dispute resolution, also see Gale, supra note 162, at 427-28; and Porter, supra note 147,
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only that planning is highly important to effective growth management, but
also that a structure needs to be found that will resolve the inevitable
dissension created by the planning process. States and their localities
often will have different growth management objectives, the localities
seeking to further their own self-interests despite any negative
consequences for their immediate neighbors or the larger region, and state
government usually concerned with state-wide or region-wide interests that
may well be inconsistent with individual locality preferences.
A striking feature of growth management programs is the wide range
of legal controls relied on to carry out growth management objectives and
plans. Urban growth can be influenced in so many ways that almost
every type of legal control over urban land potentially is adaptable to
effective growth management.170 A particular legal control becomes part
of a growth management program if aimed at achieving growth
management objectives. Among legal controls commonly used in urban
growth management efforts are development caps on new construction.
These include such limits set by a city or town as the maximum number
of new housing unit permits, the maximum total square footage of new
office space that will be authorized each year, and moratoria for a period
of time on new residential or industrial construction. Another common
approach is to restrict the kind of use permitted at particular locations,
with the aim of affecting patterns of growth. Zoning and subdivision
regulations often are imposed as growth management techniques for
regulating the form and intensity of urban growth. A similar approach
is to encourage more compact urban areas and to prevent urban sprawl by
establishing urban growth boundaries at or somewhat beyond existing
built-up outskirts of metropolitan regions, and by prohibiting or drastically
limiting most urban-type development outside these boundaries. Oregon
and Hawaii have most effectively made use of urban growth
boundaries. l7l A special aim of urban growth boundary restrictions has
usually been the protection of natural resource areas from the damaging
at 494-95.
170. For a survey of the varied and wide-ranging legal controls and alternative
techniques available to growth management, see SCHIFFMAN, supra note 150. Among
techniques covered by Schiffinan, generally not considered in discussions of growth
management controls, are agricultural buffers, density bonuses, land trusts, transferable
development rights, and zero lot line housing. On growth management techniques, also
see MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF GROwrH, supra note 143, chs. 12, 14 & 15.
171. On urban growth boundaries, see Robert C. Einsweiler & Deborah A. Howe,
Managing "The Land Between": A Rural Development Paradigm, in ABBOTI ET AL.,
supra note 143, ch. 12; KELLY, supra note 143, at 53-54, 119-20,213-16; KNAAP &
NELSON, supra note 143, ch. 2; Arthur C. Nelson, Oregon ~ Urban Growth Boundary
Policy as a Landmark Planning Tool, in ABBOTI ET AL., supra note 143, ch. 2.
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effects of urban growth. These protected areas often include agricultural
and forest lands and such environmentally sensitive areas as wetlands,
flood plains, and river and lake fronts. Among other legal controls
resorted to for protecting natural resource areas from urban growth are
development permit requirements, environmental impact statement
requirements, and restraints on air, water, and ground pollution. 172 Still
another set of legal controls that are imposed in efforts to affect urban
growth relate to government authorization of where and when needed
infrastructure may be constructed. Because adequate roads and utility
installations are normally necessary to properly open urban-rural fringe
areas to urban development, the government may regulate the rate and
intensity of development by implementing concurrency requirements that
adequate infrastructure be available by the time that major urban
development occurs. This can be another effective means of managing
urban growth. 173 Additionally, some central cities make use of their
power to limit utility extensions beyond their boundaries as a means of
reducing the negative impacts of suburban growth on the central
cities.174
Government funding and the manipulation of fund-raising techniques
are additional forms of legal control frequently used by governments to
carry out growth management objectives. Illustrative of these controls
are: appropriation of public funds to build roads or to build and operate
mass transit facilities; purchase by government of open-space areas to
remove them temporarily or permanently from urban development;175
and property tax preferences to owners of agricultural lands near urban
172. On the relation of environmental considerations to controlling urban growth,
see John S. Banta, Environmental Protection and Growth Management, in
UNDERSTANDING GROWTH MANAGEMENT, supra note 143, at 134-55. For
comprehensive review of the law of open space and natural resource protection, see 5B
RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, ch. 79A (patrick J. Rohan, rev. ed.
1994); and WILLIAMS, supra note 112, chs. 157, 158 (1985 & Supp. 1993).
173. On concurrency, see sources cited supra note 161.
174. Supportive of such central city action is Biggs, supra note 151, at 304, stating
that the fact that city action denying extension of municipal services outside its
boundaries is the proper exercise of city power to affect legitimate policy goals.
175. An extreme form of government land acquisition to further urban growth
objectives is land banking, the purpose ofwhich is to removelarge blocks of developable
land from current urban development forces and to enable government eventually to
dispose ofthe land consistent with urban growth plans, perhaps profiting from sale of the
land as well. Such support for land banking as previously existed in the United States
has largely disappeared. On land banking, see ANN L. STRONG, LAND BANKINo:
EUROPEAN REALlTY, AMERICAN PROSPECT (1979); HARVEY L. FLECHNER, LAND
BANKINO IN THE CONTROL OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT (1974); and A.L.I., supra note
146, at Art. 6.
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communities for as long as the use remains agricultural, thereby
preventing or postponing urbanization. Government also frequently shifts
the costs of new infrastructure resulting from urban growth to developers
and benefited private land owners. Cost shifting tactics include special
assessments, exactions, impact fees, and forced dedications. Major
considerations in growth management are how and by whom new
infrastructure costs should be paid, and whether placing the cost burden
heavily on private sector developers and land owners in the immediate
vicinity will seriously discourage desired growth.
As a recognized movement, urban growth management in the United
States goes back to the early 1970s.176 Since then, what has it
accomplished? Probably its most important achievement has been its
effect in expanding reliance on, and acceptance of, comprehensive
planning as essential to effective government control of urban land use.
Much of this increased approval of comprehensive planning results from
the adoption of joint local-state growth management programs by nine
states. In all of these programs, comprehensive planning is an essential
feature. Moreover, these states have made great progress in developing
comprehensive plans that, through negotiation, data exchange, and careful
review, adjust the inherent differences that arise between individual
localities and their respective states over plan provisions. These
procedures for plan development and approval, and the institutional
structures created to make the procedures workable, are additional highly
significant contributions of contemporary urban growth management. It
has become evident that, in most states, comprehensive planning capable
of being fully implemented requires meaningful participation by a unit of
government with jurisdiction greater than a single town or city. The
spillover problem from autonomous town or city controls, and the lack of
financial resources sufficient to enable anyone town or city on its own to
implement many important aspects of comprehensive plans, dictate the
need for regional, state, or federal government intervention, with state
government intervention often the most feasible. Local government
generally is too powerful to be ignored; but it is too self-centered and
resource-limited to be given exclusive comprehensive planning
responsibility. Furthermore, without the inducements, coercive or
otherwise, that a higher level of government can usuaUy bring to bear,
176. Common features of contemporary urban growth management, however,
appeared earlier, such as master plans, comprehensive plans, development plans, and
state land development planning. For discussions of these earlier planning approaches,
see James B. Milner, The Development Plan and Master Plans: Comparisons, in LAW
AND LAND: ANGLO-AMERICAN PLANNING PRACTICE 47 (Charles M. Haar ed., 1964);
Charles M. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impennanent Constitution, 20 LAW & CONTBMP.
PROBS. 353 (1955); and A.L.I., supra note 146, Commentary on Art. 7.
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many local governments will never become involved in comprehensive
planning.
In their actual impact on urban growth, the achievements of growth
management programs have been less impressive. Most of the programs
that include substantial joint local-state government action have not been
in effect long enough to get much beyond the planning stage. As to the
others, including Oregon, accurate calculation of the effects of growth
management programs on the rate and type of urban growth is difficult,
and data are sketchy.177 A number of hard-to-measure variables, other
than growth management program requirements, have been relevant to
growth patterns. Such variables include in-state prosperity, the degree of
state fiscal stress, infrastructure adequacy, population density, and
population migration patterns, all of which can vary considerably over
time and from place to place. Despite data evaluation difficulties, certain
conclusions as to urban growth management program impacts seem
obvious. For example, it is apparent that in some places urban growth
management has resulted in more compact urban development, and in
areas just beyond urbanized regions, has resulted in more agricultural land
preservation and less natural resource destruction in environmentally
sensitive areas. This seems quite evident in the Portland, Oregon, area,
including much of the Willamette Valley south of Portland,178 and in
Hawaii, especially greater Honolulu, which includes the entire island of
Oahu.179 Another apparent impact of growth management is that in
Florida, and probably in other states, growth management concurrency
requirements have reduced the likelihood that newly urbanized
communities will lack adequate infrastructure and public services. 180
Furthermore, whatever their effect on enhanced urban sprawl and higher
housing prices, the phased growth management programs of some local
governments have retarded growth within their borders. 181 Growth
177. For excellent evaluations of the Oregon program, see ABBOIT BT AL., supra
note 143; and KNAAP & NELSON, supra note 143. For a brief summation of the Oregon
program's achievements, see Arthur C. Nelson, Blazing New Planning Trails in Oregon,
49 URB. LAND 32 (1990).
178. See generally, Einsweiler & Howe, supra note 171; KELLY, supra note 143,
at 118-20, 213-15; KNAAP & NELSON, supra note 143, at 147-53; Nelson, supra note
171.
179. KELLY, supra note 143, at 106-07.
180. On concurrency requirements, see sources cited supra note 161.
181. A California study indicates that the effect of growth caps on population
increases in localities imposing these caps has been rather limited. John D. Landis, Do
Growth Controls Work? A New Assessment, 58 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 489 (1992). But
compare data on growth control restraints in Santa Cruz, California discussed in Paul L.
Niebanck, Growth Controls and the Production of Inequality, in UNDERSTANDING
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management is a comparatively new movement, but it has been achieving
results beyond just the preparation and adoption of promising
comprehensive plans.
Despite their planning and other achievements to date, and their
promise of greater achievements in the future, urban growth management
programs have drawn considerable criticism and have created considerable
controversy. Some of the criticism has been directed at the planning
process: that the process takes too long, data on which plans are based
often are inadequate and incompetently assessed, sufficient state oversight
of local planning is commonly lacking, and states have frequently failed
to provide enough, if any, funding and technical assistance to localities in
need of help to prepare satisfactory plans. l82 Criticism has also been
leveled at the consequences of urban growth management programs, at
what their effect has been, and what their effect would be even if they
achieved their objectives. One growth management effect that has been
criticized is the adverse spillover consequences of some programs,
consequences that state-wide and region-wide programs have sought to
correct, presumably with some success.l83
Some commentators are suggesting, however, that for certain problems,
natural resource and environmental protection particularly, even state-wide
growth management is insufficient to deal with spillover, and that more
GRO\VfH MANAGEMENT, supra note 143, at 105, 107-16.
182. For adverse comments about the growth management planning process, see
DEGROVE, supra note 143, at 30,49,63-64, 113, 167; Banta, supra note 172, at 148-
49, 154-55; Pelham, supra note 161, at 1047-52; Gary Pivo, Is the Growth Management
Act Working? A Survey ofResource Lands and Critical Areas DevelopmentRegulations,
16 U. PuGET SOUND L. REV., 1141, 1175-79 (1993); and Porter, State Growth
Management, supra note 147, at 502-03.
183. On spillover consequences, see ADVISORY COMMISSION ON REGULATORY
BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URB. DEV., "NOT
IN My BACKYARD," REMOVING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 2-3 & 2-4 (1991),
and on urban sprawl, see infra notes 189-90.
An eminent observer of the urban scene, Anthony Downs, takes the position that
a new vision of metropolitian area growth is needed that favors less sprawl and more
dense development, and for change to occur it is important that middle- and upper-
income suburban residents in large numbers adopt this vision and recognize that
metropolitan area problems are regional in nature and require implementation of regional
policies. The new vision is necessary to counter the disadvantages of the present
dominant vision of unlimited low-density spread of metropolitan areas, disadvantages
such as frequent traffic congestion, lack of enough affordable housing, socioeconomic
isolation of the poor in central cities, sitings of undesirable land uses, and excessive loss
of open space. DOWNS, supra note 143, ch. 1. But Downs is pessimistic about the new
vision being extensively enough adopted to reverse current low-density metropolitan
growth patterns. [d. at 195. In his analysis, however, he gives little attention to what
has been achieved so far by the growth management movement.
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national or even international governmental intervention is needed. 184
Growth management has also been attacked for interfering with market
forces, with resultant costly inefficiencies. This attack usually focuses on
higher housing costs. Although studies vary considerably as to how
extensively housing costs are increased as a result of growth management
programs, the conclusion is generally that the increase is appreciable. 185
Higher housing prices are most likely to be incurred by home buyers
entering a housing market after controls are imposed. and by tenants.
They also tend to have exclusioID!ry effects on lower-income. especially
minority. residents. Of course, higher prices may be accompanied by
added amenities, such as lower residential densities and less traffic
congestion,l86 and one answer to the exclusionary effects of higher
market prices for housing is increased government subsidies for low- and
moderate-income residents. l87 Moreover. in some circumstances, more
expensive housing may be a necessary corollary of achieving acceptable
environmental protection. 188
Another controversial growth management issue is urban sprawl: has
184. E.g., Banta, supra note 172, at 144-46; GROWfH MANAOEMENT: THE
PlANNINo CHALLENOE OF THE 1990s, supra note 143, at 223-24. Sustainable
development, preserving the environment globally for future as well as present human
needs, is a currently popular concept in environmental protection circles that looks to
more than state-wide growth management. On sustainable development, see id. at 228-
30; and Lloyd W. Bookout, Sustainable Development: Looking at the Big Picture, 50
URB. LAND 36 (1991).
185. On housing cost effects of growth management, see KELLY, supra note 143,
at 179-205; William A. Fischel, lWlat Do Economists Know About Growth Controls?
A Research Review, in UNDERSTANDINO GROWfH MANAOEMENT, supra note 143, at 59-
86; Robert Engle et aI., On the Theory of Growth Controls, 32 J. URB. EeoN. 269
(1992); and Lawrence Katz & Kenneth T. Rosen, The Interjurisdictional Effects of
Growth Controls on Housing Prices, 30 J. L. & EeoN. 149 (1987). However, lenient
controls may result in little or no growth management impact on housing prices. See
results of a growth control study of seven mid-sized California cities, in Landis, supra
note 181.
186. The amenity tradeoff possibility is stressed in Navarro & Carson, supra note
145.
187. On the subsidy point, see David R. Godschalk, In Defense of Growth
Management, 58 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 422, 424 (1992), responding to Anthony Downs
in Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing, who defends the recommendations for
dealing with housing cost increases resulting from government regulations, as made in
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON REOULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSINO, supra
note 183. The Commission's report is generally negative on growth controls, stressing
the adverse spillover consequences possible from legally imposed growth controls. Id.
at 2-1 to 2-5.
188. This seems to be Chinitz's view. See Chinitz, supra note 144, at 7-8.
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growth management effectively contained urban sprawl, can it do so, and
is urban sprawl really undesirable and something to be avoided? Urban
sprawl, although a term with varying shades of meaning, usually denotes
overall low-density development at the urban periphery, often including
leap-frog development at scattered locations surrounded by rural
openspace, and extended built-up commercial and industrial strips
alongside major highways at the outskirts of urban areas. The evils
attributed to urban sprawl include: more costly infrastructure such as roads
and utilities, as they must be extended more widely than would be
necessary with more compact development; longer commutation
requirements; and loss of more agricultural and other open-space lands
than would have occurred with more dense and less spread-out
urbanization.189 But how effective have growth management programs
been in preventing sprawl? Towns and cities imposing controls
independently of their neighbors can usually do little to prevent urban
sprawl, and often their growth control efforts will actually increase it.1OO
However, what about growth management programs that are region-wide
or state-wide; how effective have they been in curtailing sprawl? Data are
unavailable to satisfactorily answer this question, but there are indications
that even in Oregon and Florida, two of the more experienced states in
joint local-state growth management efforts, considerable urban sprawl has
occurred.191 The issue of urban sprawl becomes more troublesome and
189. On the purported evils of urban sprawl, see KELLY, supra note 143, at 130-34,
164-73; REAL EsTATE REsEARCH CORPORATION, THE COSTS OF SPRAWL (1975); and
Wtlliam A. Fischel, Growth Management Reconsidered: Goodfor the Town, Bad For the
Nation?, A Comment, 57 J. AM PLAN. Ass'N 341 (1991).
190. However, those localities whose jurisdiction includes extensive nonurbanized
but urbanizable areas have the potential to prevent or drastically limit urban sprawl and
its adverse consequences. These jurisdictions include many counties, if they have the
legal authority; towns and cities with extraterritorial zoning powers; and the occasional
town or city that, usually as the result of relatively recent annexation, has expanded its
boundaries well beyond the present urban-rural fringe. Annexation and city-eounty
consolidation as means of dealing with urban sprawl and a number of other urban
problems are being urged by some. See, e.g., KELLY, supra note 143, at 73-77; DAVID
RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS (1993). But in most states, cities lack the effective
power to expand geographically.
191. On the Oregon and Florida experience, see 'KNAAP & NELSON, supra note 143,
at 219-20; Porter, State Growth Management, supra note 147, at 496-97; and Keith W.
Dearborn & Ann M. Gygi, Planner's Panacea or Pandora's Box: A Realistic
Assessmentofthe Role ofUrban Growth Areas in Achieving Growth Management Goals,
16 U. PuOBT SOUND L. REv. 975, at 1004-10 (1993). The Portland metropolitan area
has had better results in containing urban growth within designated boundaries, in part
because of higher housing density requirements imposed within those boundaries. See
Porter, State Growth Management, supra note 147, at 497. However, Knasp & Nelson,
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contentious if the views of some knowledgeable observers are considered:
that urban sprawl frequently is beneficial and generally not to be
discouraged. Among arguments advanced by these observers are that in
a market economy urban sprawl is efficient; that sprawl is accompanied
by decentralization of both employment and residential sites, thereby
reducing traffic congestion and commutation distances; that without
sprawl, more compact urbanization occurs that exacerbates environmental
problems; and that, if denser urban development is what is desired, infill
following sprawl is likely to result ultimately in a more dense urban
area.192
A very basic controversy that has haunted the growth management
movement since its inception is the degree of effective autonomy each
town and city should have in controlling land within its borders. Should
this autonomy be nearly complete or should power be extensively shared
with geographically larger units of government: the county, a regional
government, the state or the federal government? And if shared, on what
matters, and how fully should power be shared? In growth management
settings, the tension usually is over the relative power of localities and the
states, often centered on home rule rights. Whatever the declared reasons
for the positions they take on controversial growth management issues,
local governments and their influential constituencies often are motivated
by the desire to retain power. Friction over how power should be
allocated can be a significant undercurrent in any of the other
controversial growth management issues.
Although legislation and comprehensive plans are the principal legal
sources for how urban growth management programs are structured and
implemented, judicial case law also is significant. There is, for instance,
a substantial body of case law that helps clarify the legal limits of the
various land use related controls, such as zoning and subdivision
regulations, available to government in furthering its growth management
efforts. Some of these opinions clear up ambiguities in statutes or
administrative regulations pertaining to land use controls. Some set forth
criteria for what is and is not constitutionally permissible in government
imposing controls on land use. Among these latter are such well-known
recent United States Supreme Court cases as NO/lan,l93 First
supra note 143, see risks that this containment will not continue. Id. at 64-68.
192. These views are considered in Chinitz, supra note 144; and Ivonne Audirac et
al., Ideal Urban Fonn and VISions of the Good Life: Florida's Growth Management
Dilemma, S6 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 470 (1990).
193. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (stating that
conditioning a landowner's building permit on the landowner granting a public-access
easement is, without compensation, an unconstitutional taking because there is not a
nexus between the condition imposed and the government purpose behind the restriction
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English,l94 Lucas,195 and Dollan. l96 There is also a line of cases
testing the constitutionality of staged growth measures taken by individual
towns or cities. These measures generally have been upheld as
constitutional, but run the risk of invalidity if thW prevent reasonable use
of land for an excessive period of time. 1 As to the growth
management programs in the nine states engaged in joint local-state
growth management efforts, the most extensive body of judicial case law
has developed in Oregon, the state that has done the most in program
implementation. Much of the Oregon litigation concerns alleged
noncompliance with local government plans or with land management
goals adopted by the State Land Conservation and Development
Commission.198 In the other eight states, there is much less case law
dealing directly with urban growth management programs, as the
programs in these states have been less fully implemented than in Oregon,
and some are too new to have resulted in court action.
The urban growth management concept has great and growing appeal,
particularly in communities under heavy growth pressure. Growth
management programs have become a major means of urban land use
control in many parts of the United States. Moreover, their importance
on building).
194. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (stating that where an ordinance denies a landowner all
use of its property for a substantial period of time, the invalidation of the ordinance
without payment of fair value for the use of the property during the period of temporary
taking would be a constitutionally insufficient remedy).
195. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992)
(holding that ifa state regulation deprives land ofall economically beneficial use, without
compensation, it is an unconstitutional taking, unless justified on title or nuisance
grounds).
196. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (holding that for a
constitutional municipal exaction conditioning private land development, without
compensation, there must be rough proportionality between the exaction and the impact
of the proposed development).
197. See supra note 151.
198. The Oregon caselaw is surveyed in 5 NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M.
TAYLOR, AMERICAN LAND P1.ANNINo LAW, LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER, §§
160.15-160.26.50 (rev. ed. 1985 & 1994 Supp.). Many of these cases are appeals to
Oregon appellate courts from decisions ofa state agency, the Land Use Board ofAppeals
(LUBA). LUBA, established by the state legislature in 1979, has initial review
jurisdiction over most land use decisions of local, state, and special district government
agencies. LUBA, rather than state trial courts, was given this jurisdiction to provide
greater expertise and consistency in land use decisions. On LUBA, see Edward J.
Sullivan, Oregon Blazes a Trail, in STATE AND REGIONAL COMPREHENSNE P1.ANNINo,
supra note 143, at 69-79.
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has been substantially enhanced by the emergence of joint local-state
government efforts to integrate diverse types of legal controls pursuant to
comprehensive plans, and to do so on a regional or state-wide basis,
generally absorbing zoning in the process. These intergovernmental
efforts have had a particularly successful implementation record in
Oregon, and they have politically and statutorily pieced together very
promising operational structures in states as different as Florida, New
Jersey, and Vermont. In addition, there is considerable support in other
states for adopting state-wide comprehensive planning directed at
achieving growth management goals, including California, New York,
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Virginia, and North
Carolina. l99 The urban growth management movement shows great
vitality and promise. But growth management programs are faced with
very difficult power sharing, funding, goal consistency, and government
coordination problems. Whether they can overcome such serious
problems remains to be seen. If they can, they well may become the most
important force in American government efforts to control urban land.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The sample of four separate and unique government land control
programs reviewed above suggests some significant generalizations about
why government imposes major programs to control urban land use, how
its programmatic efforts are shaped, and what it is able to accomplish.
The importance, variety and longevity of the programs reviewed enhance
their usefulness as sources ofvalid observations about the government land
use control process.
A. Program Objectives
Each government urban land use control program typically is a
response to some problem widely perceived as serious enough to merit
government imposition of legal controls, and with a government
commitment that through the program it will attempt to substantially
alleviate the central problem. Among the problems that government urban
land use control programs have sought to deal with are living conditions
of the poor, the decline of many central cities, reducing the
incompatibility ofland uses, threats to the natural environment, and spatial
patterns ofurban expansion. Each program typically does not seek to deal
with all aspects of the underlying problem, but rather focuses more
199. On support for statewide comprehensive planning in these states, see Patricia
E. Salkin, Statewide Comprehensive Planning: The Next Wave, in STATBAND REOIONAL
COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING, supra note 143, at 236-55.
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narrowly and on one principal objective or a narrow range of principal
objectives. These focal objectives have broad support and substantial
appeal, are well-publicized, and tend to characterize what the program is
about. illustrative objectives of this sort are improved housing for the
poor, slum clearance, revitalizing central city downtown areas, reducing
incompatibility of land uses, eliminating environmental pollution, and
facilitating orderly and cost efficient urban expansion. But to enhance
public and political support, each program typically develops ancillary
objectives that appeal to important interest groups. Examples ofobjectives
of this sort are adding jobs during a recessionary period or in a depressed
area, increasing the local property tax base, preserving local land values,
protecting community life styles by effectively excluding residents and
businesses the community considers undesirable, and holding down
government service costs. Joint local-state growth management programs,
with their emphasis on comprehensiveness in planning, are atypical in the
large number of objectives they seek to advance. Such a broad-based
approach helps attract support for the program but creates difficulties in
efforts to balance so many competing, and to some extent inconsistent,
objectives.
B. Opposition, Controversy, and Compromise
Although all major government urban land use control programs
develop extensive popular and political support, they all also encounter
opposition, and at least some aspects of each program become
controversial. Opposition is to be expected, as all major government land
controls have adverse effects on some groups. For instance, controls may
result in many people's property taxes being increased, their property
values reduced, their business opportunities curtailed, or their
neighborhoods threatened in other ways they oppose. Control programs
also may fail to deliver as promised, or may have serious dysfunctional
side effects, thereby adding to the opposition. Slum· clearance, for
example, may have severe negative consequences for many poor people
and businesses forced to relocate, public housing projects often become
centers of drug dealing and violence threatening to all project and nearby
residents, and zoning frequently blocks much-needed change. Program
shortcomings of these kinds may emerge early in the life of a program or
they may arise later when underlying conditions change, as by a city aging
and its buildings and infrastructure deteriorating, or by massive
demographic shifts in a community resulting in a population with new
needs and preferences. A program appropriate for one period may
become ill-suited to a later one. Ideological differences, too, can lead to
opposition or heighten opposition feelings. Common ideological
differences apparent in urban land use control controversies are the merits
of regulation versus the free market, of comprehensive planning versus
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more narrowly directed control responses, and of local home rule versus
added effective power in regional, state, or national governments.
Opposition is an inherent feature of major urban land use control
programs but so are attempts, often successful, to respond to this
opposition. Opposition results in controversy, and controversy frequently
leads to compromise that yields program modifications. All the programs
reviewed have gone through extensive modifications over time, largely in
response to controversy and resultant compromise. These modifications
may be in the laws authorizing a program, in program procedures, or in
program staffing. Relatively frequent changes of these kinds tend to occur
in all government urban land use control programs, and can be essential
to continued program viability. The rate of change in laws pertaining to
such programs is quite different from the glacial evolution usually
characteristic of common law concepts. Program modification also may
occur in how government officials choose to use their discretion in
program administration and enforcement. Those in government
responsible for program implementation have considerable discretion in
just how the program is carried out: how fully and vigorously, and in
which objectives are emphasized. Program controversies may center, not
on the laws setting up the program, but on the discretionary policies and
practices of those government officials charged with program
implementation. Examples of this are the alleged mismanagement of
public housing in some localities, frequent criticism of zoning boards of
appeal in their largely discretionary rulings on variance requests, and the
ostensible favoritism of federal officials in approving projects for
allocation of urban renewal funds.
C. Legal Controls Imposed
There are four principal kinds of legal controls potentially useful in
government efforts to deal with urban land use problems. They are
regulation, government subsidies, taxation for control purposes, and
government ownership.200 The last three of these obviously rely
200. Regulation, as the tenn is used here, consists of government imposed
restrictions on how land may be used or developed and by whom. Regulation may take
many fonns, and may unconditionally prohibit certain uses or developments. Or it may
pennit a use or development only under limited circumstances or if required government
approval or other requisite steps are f11"st taken. Government subsidies are government
funds or funding supports provided to achieve control goals. Subsidies may be grants
of money or they may be loans or mortgage insurance or other insurance not obtainable
in the private market. Subsidies make money available directly or through supports or
backups that may induce funding from private sources. Taxation for control purposes
involves tax preferences or disincentives imposed not just to raise revenue but to
influence taxpayer behavior for other purposes. This kind of legal control may take such
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primarily on some type ofgovernment economic aid to further government
objectives. The four programs reviewed above suggest some significant
conclusions about the legal controls utilized by major urban land use
control programs. Some programs must have substantial government
economic aid to achieve their principal objectives, regulation is not
enough. Depending on the nature of the program and its political
acceptability, this aid can come in the form of subsidies, tax inducements,
or favorable use of government owned realty, or some combination of
these. More particularly, this may mean building and operating
government owned housing, as in the public housing program; government
providing writedown costs for land acquisition and clearance, as in urban
renewal; or government funding for infrastructure, as in some managed
growth programs. In many instances, the private sector will not, and
usually cannot, fill the need to which the controls are directed, at least
without extensive government economic aid. Politically, and often
constitutionally, regulation alone will not suffice. In the big programs of
government aid, however, regulation can be a helpful, even essential,
supplement to the economic aid government makes available, bolstering
or conditioning that aid. But not all major government urban land control
programs require large infusions ofgovernment economic aid. Some need
rely only on regulation, which is generally far cheaper to government than
if one or more of the other control forms is used. lllustrative of the many
government programs relying almost entirely on regulation are zoning and
some managed growth efforts.
D. Intergovernmental Participation
The need for massive economic aid from government is one reason
major government urban land control programs often are
intergovernmental in nature, with extensive cooperative participation of
two or more levels of government-local, state, and federal. The federal
government, in particular, is likely to be involved because it is, or at least
has been, the best source of large-scale economic aid. Local government
participation is likely because of the strong tradition that land is a local
fonns as tax exemptions, tax deductions, or preferred tax rates for some classes of
taxpayers. Government ownership as a kind of legal control is the use of government
owned property to achieve control objectives. Thus government land may be used for
government operations, for designated private recreational or business purposes, or for
other purposes consistent with the public interest. Much of the land in the United States,
including many urban sites, is owned by government and quite universally held for
furtherance of some legal control objective. Government ownership of land-with
government directing how its land shall be used, developed, or disposed of-historically
has been a highly important means for government legally to control land, and this kind
of control remains significant today even for urban land.
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government concern, and because its proximity to those most affected can
greatly facilitate the imposition of controls and hopefully also minimize
opposition. Furthermore, federal and state governments may become
involved to enhance prospects for consistent application of program
objectives throughout metropolitan areas or beyond, and to reduce
negative spillover risks from local government action. These
intergovernmental cooperative ventures, however, create their own
frictions. Almost invariably the different levels of government have
disagreements with one another over such matters as how aid should be
conditioned, how it should be dispensed, who should be benefited, and
how programs should be administered. Federal-local government frictions
were pronounced in the urban renewal program, for example, and they
often have emerged in the public housing program. Local-state frictions
have arisen frequently in joint local-state urban growth management
programs. Intergovernmental programs in which substantial controls are
imposed, but in which economic aid is an essential and comes principally
from one level of government, seem particularly vulnerable to
intergovernmental conflict. The quid pro quo for aid then is likely to be
such substantial intervention by the aid provider as to create resentment
in the other participating governments.
E. Federal Government Financial Assistance
Federal financial aid to urban areas, including direct or indirect
funding to help physically renew and revitalize central cities and their
poverty enclaves, has declined in recent years. In part this results from
an ideology prevalent in many powerful political circles that the federal
government, and to some extent all government, should be less involved
in local problems, and land use problems in particular. But also important
are the continued federal budgetary deficits and the tremendous
accumulated federal debt. These budget and debt problems, together with
the federal government's priority commitments on entitlement programs,
mean that federal financial aid for urban land use purposes probably will
remain very tight for some time to come. This puts increased financial
pressures on local government, and especially on the states, to fund the
kinds of programs that the federal government has been relied on to fund.
Obviously there are very real limitations on local and state government
funding capacities.
F. Role ofthe Courts
Determining what legal controls will be utilized, and when and how
controls will be put into effect, is overwhelmingly the responsibility of
legislatures, including city councils, and of administrative agencies
assigned to program implementation. Little help from the courts is
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required. Innovative legislative measures pertaining to control programs
may come before the courts for rulings as to their constitutionality.
Courts are occasionally also called on to construe the meaning of relevant
land use statutes or regulations, and the courts regularly are resorted to for
resolution of a few kinds of conflicts that arise frequently in administering
some programs, such as evictions from public housing and appeals in
zoning variance cases. Overwhelmingly, however, controversies that arise
in connection with major urban land use control programs of the kinds
considered here are left to the political arena for determination, without
involvement of the courts.
G. Program Termination
Once adopted and operational, major government urban land use
control programs are difficult to terminate. Over time, policies and
procedures are likely to be modified in response to how a program's
actual and anticipated performance is perceived by persons with influence
and authority, and these periodic modifications usually are sufficient to
sustain the program indefinitely. However, termination can occur.
Conditions that may lead to termination are conflicting program
objectives, especially if powerful interest groups become dissatisfied with
compromise arrangements, persistently high government funding costs,
and troublesome adverse side effects, particularly if they are more
serious than originally anticipated and are not corrected or even
correctable. A combination of these conditions was largely responsible for
bringing an end to the federal urban renewal program. High government
funding costs and adverse side effects in the form of extensive on-site
criminal activity are threatening termination of the present federal
government-supported public housing program. This threat to public
housing is enhanced by an available alternative, attractive to many, of
privately owned but federally subsidized low-income housing. A major
government control program may be terminated as a separate program by
being absorbed into a larger program with broader objectives and
potentially greater effectiveness. For example, zoning in some places is
in the process of being incorporated into more inclusive and ambitious
growth management programs. Still another reason for ending a major
government urban growth control program is that the problem that gave
rise to the program has faded away. lllustrative of this are towns that
established strict phased growth programs when under heavy growth
pressure, and then the growth stopped, either because the town became
fully developed or was no longer an attractive growth center, following
which the phased growth program was ended. For one reason or another,
eventually every major government urban land use control program no
doubt will be terminated. But programs of this kind have very long life
anticipation.
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H. A Particularly Crucial Underlying Problem
[Vol. 39
One underlying problem pertaining to urban land use is so serious and
so far-reaching and disastrous in its consequences, with even more
disastrous consequences threatened for the future, that it is imperative that
more realistic and constructive solutions be sought. This problem is that
of the poor and disadvantaged, particularly those with little education, few
if any skills, and little or no steady employment possibilities, who are
concentrated mostly in central city urban enclaves under conditions
discouraging to human development, and under circumstances far too often
conducive to unacceptable behavior. Life in these inner-city enclaves is
marked by unusually high incidences of unemployment, crime, substance
abuse, welfare reliance, school dropouts, teenage pregnancy, and single-
parent families. Moreover, conditions in inner-city communities seem
likely to get worse as available employment for the unskilled and semi-
skilled declines still further, due in large part to increased automation of
manufacturing jobs and further movement of low-skilled jobs to other
domestic areas or abroad; as inner-city poverty or near-poverty
populations expand; and, as inner-city frustrations and resentments more
frequently result in hostile and disruptive acts, acts directed not only
inward but outward toward the majority population.
Inner-city troubles are accentuated by racial and ethnic discrimination.
A high percentage of inner-city residents are minorities. Being minorities
limits where they can live and tends to restrict them to inner-city
neighborhoods. This discrimination against minority inner-city residents
has become more intense with the growing incidences of undesirable
conduct by inner-city minority residents. Many majority whites oppose
movement of inner-city minorities into predominantly white
neighborhoods, in no small part out of fear that this movement will cause
a decline in neighborhood security and in neighborhood economic and
moral values. Many majority whites even oppose expanding aid to inner-
cities, arguing that the high incidence ofundesirable behavior by inner-city
residents has shown that those in these areas are not deserving of greater
assistance. Why help those who choose to behave improperly, the
reasoning goes. Opportunities for a better life are available, and if not
taken advantage of, the rest of society should not be required to increase
the help it makes possible, especially if this means paying higher taxes.
It is even being widely asserted that sharp cuts in welfare assistance,
housing aid included, will be beneficial to the poor by eliminating their
dependency life styles and forcing them to seek gainful employment that
will lift them out of poverty. Very popular, however, are proposals for
tougher criminal laws, more criminal convictions, and longer
imprisonments. Emphasis on coercion or threats of coercion is considered
by many as the best way to deal with those who get seriously out of line
or who may be tempted to do so.
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Crucial to more satisfactory and effective government efforts to
resolve the problem of the urban poor and disadvantaged are changes in
popular attitudes toward the problem. It must be recognized that the
problem is everyone's responsibility, not just the responsibility of those in
central cities, where most poverty is centered; and that conditions will get
worse for all of us if current social disorganization trends in poverty-
stricken communities are not reversed. Furthermore, relying too heavily
on more punitive criminal laws and more aggressive criminal law
enforcement will not solve the problem. Nor, if adopted, will the drastic
reductions in welfare assistance being proposed have the beneficial
consequences for the poor that it is asserted will be forthcoming.
Fundamental flaws exist in our society that need correction. There is
relatively little that a more coercive criminal law process can do to correct
them and cutting welfare assistance is not the answer either.
Achieving major changes in popular attitudes toward the urban poor,
however, will be very difficult. The persistently unacceptable behavioral
patterns of many in urban communities who are poor and disadvantaged
makes it much harder to change these attitudes. The offenders usually are
at fault and deserving of blame, but finding fault and placing blame does
little to eliminate unacceptable behavioral patterns in the communities
from which these people come. We should focus much more on reducing
the underlying causes of poverty and the unacceptable behavior that so
frequently accompanies poverty, especially in urban communities with
large concentrations of poor people. We must realize that effective
corrective action often will cost money, substantial sums of money, and
that middle- and upper-income taxpayers-including those in the suburbs
-will be paying most of this cost if appropiate measure are taken.
Moreover, those expenditures, if properly made, will be in the long-term
interests of everyone by reducing the potentially calamitous risks of a
highly bifurcated and polarized society.
I. Recommendations
The four programs reviewed, over long periods of time, have records
of considerable accomplishment consistent with their objectives. They all
have been contentious and have drawn strong opposition, but each has
shown remarkable resilience and a capacity to survive. Only one of the
four has been terminated, and then only after a quarter-century of
substantial achievement in many American cities. Considering the
experience of the four programs, and especially the serious social
problems they have sought to deal with, what proposals seem feasible,
with a realistic possibility of eventual adoption, that will enable American
government to improve how it influences and controls urban land use?
The following are some suggestions.
1. What government can and should be doing to deal more effectively
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with the urban poor and disadvantaged, especially those concentrated in
inner-city communities, obviously is a major concern, but one that goes
well beyond what land use controls alone can accomplish. New
approaches to such matters as education, job training, welfare, police
protection, and health services are needed that transcend issues of spatial
allocations of use or the size, quality or cost of land improvements. But
how land is used does have a bearing on urban poverty and must be
considered in government attempts to deal more effectively with that
poverty and its consequences. Segregated enclaves of the inner·city poor
and disadvantaged are important aspects of urban land use, as are such
matters as the location of jobs open to the poor within reasonable
commuting distance; the adequacy of public infrastructure in inner-city
communities heavily populated by poor people; and the quality and cost
of housing for the poor wherever they live.
One needed land use related approach to reducing poverty and the
consequences of poverty is providing better or cheaper housing to far
more poor people. Existing public housing should be retained under
government control, and it should be repaired and renovated where
needed, unless so physically deteriorated as to make this too costly. In
addition, conditions in most high-rise public housing projects should be
improved by more careful tenant selection and a better-balanced tenant
mix that would include more stable families headed by persons steadily
employed. Further, there should be a substantial increase in the total
number of government assisted housing units for the poor by adding new
units of scatter-site public housing or more Section 8-type rental subsidies
to benefit poor tenants. Government at all levels, moreover, should be
providing much greater financial support to community development
corporations, private non-profit organizations that are providing not only
housing, but also social services and job-training to poverty-level residents
of many big city neighborhoods.201
More recreational facilities also should be provided in inner-city
communities, including more playgrounds, ball fields, tennis courts, and
indoor and outdoor basketball courts. Young people everywhere are
attracted to sports, but adequate participant sports facilities are lacking in
most inner-city neighborhoods. More and better sports facilities would
help divert energies away from undesirable aspects of street life. Needed
at such facilities, however, are adequate monitoring and supervision, a
substantial added expense. With sufficient oversight, recreational
activities will be better organized and the risks of delinquent behavior at
the recreational areas will be greatly reduced.
In addition, more land use related efforts should be made by
government to expand employment opportunities for poor people,
201. On community development corporations see supra note 43.
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particularly the poor in inner-city poverty enclaves. A helpful move of
this kind would include much-enlarged programs for repairing,
maintaining, and modernizing public infrastructure such as streets,
bridges, water supply systems, sewers, waste treatment plants, and park
facilities. In most big cities, particularly in poverty neighborhoods, much
of this infrastructure is in serious need of upgrading and improved
maintenance. If the chronically poor were given priority in employment
to do this work, both their needs and the cities' needs would be
accommodated. Lower labor efficiency, at least in the short run, might
be a cost element of these efforts; but this is likely to be a cost factor that
must be calculated and absorbed in almost any major attempt to bring
large numbers of poor people, many with little work experience, into the
job market. Still another example of a land use related approach for
adding to the job prospects of poor people is establishing more effective
enterprise zones, or empowerment zones as they are also known, in
designated economically depressed urban areas.202 Through
government-provided tax breaks and other government benefits, the hope
is that these will attract businesses into the benefited areas and, with or
without job preferences, provide considerable new employment for poor
people nearby. But to have much of an impact, these programs must
receive far more in government benefits than existing programs in this
country have been provided up to now.
The above, then, are illustrative land use related measures to aid the
urban poor. Many others are possible. What should be underscored
again, however, is that much more should and can be done, in the
interests of all ofus, to improve the lot of the American poor, but that any
approach with a major impact will be financially costly. The cost must be
incurred if we are to reverse the trends toward an increasingly divided and
disruptive society.
2. Large concentrations of poor and disadvantaged people in any
locality place heavy financial burdens on local governments where these
people live. The burdens are so great that most central cities and inner
suburbs where these concentrations exist find themselves unable
adequately to meet their obligations to their poor and disadvantaged
residents. Under present funding arrangements, they certainly cannot
greatly increase what they provide this segment of their population. They
202. On the new federal governmentempowermentzone and enterprisecommunities
program, strongly backed by the Clinton Administration and authorized by Congress in
the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. NQ. 103-66,107 Stat. 416, 477
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (West 1994», see Otto J. Hetzel, Some
Historical Lessons for hnplementing the Clinton Administration's Empowennent Zones
and Enterprise Communities Program: Experiencesfrom the Model Cities Program, 26
URB. LAw. 63 (1994). The article includes suggestions for making the program a
success.
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need and should acquire large new infusions of funding. One means of
making available such increased funding is by restructuring the local tax
system, especially the property tax. The added help needed by the poor
should be looked at as an obligation of all taxpayers, including those in
middIe- and upper-income suburbs. The property tax, as currently
structured, enables many suburban taxpayers to avoid much of their
obligation. One way of correcting this inequitable result is to apply the
same property tax assessment practices and the same tax rates state-wide,
and then to allocate the gross proceeds from the tax to the localities in
proportion to population or some local need formula. Another way of
dealing with the underlying funding problem is to shift to federal or state
government even more financial responsibility for housing the poor and
for providing more jobs and a better physical environment in inner-city
poverty neighborhoods. In either instance, many taxpayers not living or
working in localities with large concentrations of poor people would be
required to share more fairly the burdens of dealing with poverty.
3. More detailed and accurate data are needed on land use trends and
on the impact of government controls, both current and prospective.
When new or substantially modified controls are seriously considered,
appropriate data on likely impacts should be assembled more frequently
than has been the case in the past. Too often, legislative and
administrative requirements are based on guess or political preference,
without the needed factual foundation. This unduly increases chances of
wasted resources, wasted efforts, and disappointing and dysfunctional
results. Ongoing programs also should be regularly and carefully
evaluated to determine if they are achieving their objectives, and doing so
at acceptable costs and without unacceptable side effects. Not only should
data assembly be made by persons competent to do so, but studies and
reports should be objective and sufficiently complete. There is a danger
that such data assembly and summation wiII be biased and slanted in favor
of private or public interest sources that control the information process.
Developing qualified and objective data research directed at government
land controls can be difficult. More attempts should be made to create
government or private agency traditions of unbiased research on
government control impacts, even on issues that are politically volatile.
Emergence over the last few decades of a large coterie of land planners
qualified to do needed data assembly and evaluation has been extremely
helpful. But assuring that these specialists will be assigned to needed
control impact studies, with appropriate instructions as to objectivity, is
problematic. When needed studies are made, their release and distribution
may be greatly curtailed. A form of government land control research
that should more often be followed is the experimental demonstration
study: selecting one or more limited areas and imposing controls under
measurable testing conditions. On occasion, government agencies have
used this approach, but for reliable results, a considerable period of time
HeinOnline -- 39 N. Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 445 1994
1994] GOVERNMENI' CONTROL OF URBAN LAND USE 445
may be needed, and legislatures, in particular, have been reluctant to wait,
and too frequently have been willing to act on insufficient evidence.
4. Thorough planning prior to imposing government land use controls
is a rational way to proceed, and comprehensive planning that considers
all relevant objectives and alternative means of achieving those objectives
is the ideal form of planning. But in the field of government land use
controls, comprehensive planning has had a spotty and generally
ineffective record, despite being strongly advocated by planning
professionals. It was, for example, often ignored or slighted in
administration of the urban renewal program, and its impact, if any, on
most zoning programs has been unimpressive. However, the situation is
much different in many urban growth management programs. Through
often arduous and contentious negotiation and review procedures, the joint
local-state growth management programs appear to be making
comprehensive planning work. Politically tested plans have been produced
that have good prospects for successful implementation. In some states,
notably Oregon, much has already been achieved in plan implementation.
The big contribution of growth management so far is its development of
procedures and institutions that enable differing local, regional, and state-
wide interests to be adjusted and compromised in the process ofproducing
comprehensive plans with realistic possibilities of being fulfilled. Some
doubts, however, remain. Will sufficient government funding be
forthcoming to enable the plans to be carried out adequately? How well
will the interstate and international aspects of problems be dealt with?
And in plan implementation, can the many different and in part conflicting
objectives that the plans seek to achieve be balanced to enable all
objectives to be furthered without controversies that will destroy the entire
growth management program? Particularly troublesome is the question of
whether the growth management objective of revitalizing distressed central
city and inner-suburb areas can be integrated into a program format that
traditionally has focused on outer-suburban-fringe expansion. Conflict
over competing objectives and which ones should be favored in
implementation was an important reason for termination of the federal
urban renewal program. The joint local-state growth management
programs, however, have such good prospects of long-term success in
developing and making comprehensive plans operational that these
programs deserve to be sustained, adequately funded, and emulated by
more states.
5. Joint local-state growth management programs also merit support
and wider adoption because of the promise they show for improving
solutions to land use problems extending over much or all of a
metropolitan region. In many respects each metropolitan region is a
functional unit, but the fragmentation of local government can often
weaken a region and cause inequitable allocation of benefits and burdens
within it. A common example is the spillover effect from one local
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government jurisdiction to others from exclusionary residential zoning.
Negative spillovers also are possible from zoned industrial and commercial
activity incompatible with uses in adjoining towns. Another example is
the possible negative effect on its neighbors of one townt acting
independentlyt drastically limiting growth under a growth control
program. More efforts should be made to resolve such regional problems
by developing and implementing policies and imposing land controls that
fairly coordinate and balance interests of the entire metropolitart region or
of those towns within the region affected by the control efforts. Complete
federal or state government takeover of control programs is one way of
doing thist but on urban land use issues this has often proven to be
impossible. On these issuest local government commonly is too influential
politically to be excluded. Another approach that recently has been
effective in a few places is central city annexation of surrounding areast
reaching out close to or beyond the urban-rural fringe. This provides a
general purpose government for substantially the entire metropolitan area.
But in most localities this is not a viable possibility because of strong
suburban opposition. Joint local-state growth management programs
appear to be much better possibilities. With nudgingt direction and
funding help from thP, statet local governments are being encouraged to
face up to regional and state-wide urban land use problemst and to
participate in control programs likely to be in the regiontst as well as the
statetst long-term interests.
6. Administration of government urban land use control programs in
some communities should be made more efficient. There is unnecessary
wastet even corruptiont in some programs. Charges of this kind are often
leveled at management of public housing. Furthermoret acquiring
mandatory government approvals for land use and development may take
an unjustifiably long period of timet thereby risking serious losses to land
owners. Due to the cyclical nature of real estate financing and
construction costst as well as the cyclical character of real estate sales and
rental marketst developers are especially subject to substantial losses when
long delays occur in obtaining requisite government approvals. Illustrative
of such delayst often indicating government inefficiencyt are those that
commonly occur in obtaining variances and other zoning approvals.
Similar delays also frequently arose before urban renewal sites were ready
for development.
The changes outlined above will not easily be made. Some are
opposed by powerful vested interestst others are inconsistent with widely
held popular viewst and most will be very costly to government and
ultimately to taxpayers. The proposals for improving the lot of the poor
and for reducing poverty on a large scale will encounter strong resistancet
particularly from that large percentage of the population that currently
believes the best way to deal more effectively with inner-city problems is
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greatly increased government funding for added police, added criminal
prosecutions, and added prison capacity, and favors sharp cutbacks in
government welfare expenditures for the poor. Unfortunately, more
adversity may have to be experienced before the nation is willing to take
needed steps toward resolving its most serious urban problems, including
those that are land use related. Among adverse developments of this kind
that may occur are: more middle-class people drifting into poverty or on
the verge of doing so; more violent and damaging riots in or emanating
from inner-city poverty areas; more objectionable features to living and
working in high-growth areas; and more environmental deterioration and
destruction in or near urban communities. Some conditions may have to
get much worse before needed changes are attainable. This too often has
been the American way.
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